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Abstract 
E-commerce has rapidly grown for the past 20 years and while some traditional retailers could not 
survive the fierce competition, others were able to adapt and opened their own online stores. For 
the past decade, this has been the prevailing trend in the retail environment. In recent years, 
however, we have been witnessing to the inverse, retailers going from clicks to bricks. 
Amazon is known for having completed a high number of M&A transactions since its inception. 
The last one, in 2017, was the acquisition of Whole Foods Market and it shook the entire retail 
industry, as fears regarding a possible entrance by the e-commerce leader in the brick-and-mortar 
space spread. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse Amazon’s acquisition of Ulta, the leading U.S. beauty 
specialty retailer, as part of the company’s quest for an omnichannel presence. The in-store 
experience in the $445Bn beauty industry is of major importance and Ulta’s 1070 stores in the 
U.S. and 28 years of experience in the field stand as valuable opportunities for Amazon. 
The recommended bid price is $331,2 per share, which includes a 30% premium over the market 
price at the 21st May 2018. This value is justified by net synergies of $4.123Mm and a $373Mm 
value of control. The transaction should be a cash deal carried as a friendly takeover and has the 
potential of creating $863.1Mm for Amazon’s shareholders and an accretion of 12,4% in the first 
year’s EPS. 
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Resumo 
Com a crescente concorrência imposta pelo crescimento do comércio eletrónico nos últimos 20 
anos, muitos retalhistas tradicionais fecharam as suas lojas e, apenas aqueles que se adaptaram, 
abrindo também, eles próprios, as suas lojas online, conseguiram sobreviver. Mais recentemente, 
temos vindo a assistir a uma inversão desta tendência: empresas a saírem do espaço online para o 
espaço físico. 
A Amazon já completou várias fusões e aquisições ao longo da sua existência, tendo a última sido 
a aquisição da Whole Foods Market em 2017. Esta aquisição levantou receios relativamente à 
possível entrada do gigante do comércio eletrónico no segmento do retalho tradicional. 
Esta dissertação propõe a aquisição da Ulta pela Amazon, como forma de alcançar uma estratégica 
omnicanal. A indústria da beleza tem um caráter bastante experimental, por isso, a aquisição de 
uma empresa com 28 anos de experiência parece ser o caminho indicado para reforçar a sua posição 
neste mercado. 
A oferta de aquisição pública amigável à Ulta, com um prémio de 30% relativamente ao preço 
a 21 de maio de 2018, deverá assumir o valor de 331,2 dólares por ação, e ser pago na 
totalidade recorrendo a dinheiro. Espera-se que a aquisição origine sinergias no valor líquido 
de 4.123 milhões de dólares e valor acrescido relacionado com controlo de 373 milhões de dólares. 
Esta transação deverá criar valor para os acionistas da Amazon na ordem dos 863.1 milhões de 
dólares e aumentar o lucro por ação em 12,4% no primeiro ano após a aquisição. 
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Introduction 
In this fast-paced, innovative and ever-changing world, the question that remains in everyone’s 
head is what comes next. People have long learned how to live with innovation, some were already 
born in this technological world, others had to learn how to adapt to it. Older generations once 
walking to the nearest village, watching their black-and-white TV and shopping in the 
neighbourhood mini-market, suddenly can take the plane to visit a different continent, go to 4D 
cinemas and shop from their houses using a computer. But with so many possibilities and much 
more to come, will the old and traditional still have a place in the future? 
The retailing industry has seen substantial innovations in recent years, from augmented reality 
catalogue apps and fitting room magic mirrors to shopping recommendations given by artificial 
intelligence. But the most disruptive innovation of all times happened 20 years ago, with the rise 
of online shopping. Since then, e-commerce has rapidly grown and while some traditional retailers 
could not survive the fierce competition and closed stores, others were able to adapt and opened 
their own online stores. The question now stands as whether traditional brick-and-mortar stores 
can still be relevant in todays’ fully digital world or if they are doomed to end, just like black-and-
white TVs. 
Amazon was, without doubt, one of the pioneers in e-commerce, and, I dare to say, the most 
successful one so far. With a $780Bn market cap, and in the race to become the first company to 
reach a $1Tn value, Amazon has grown from an online bookstore to an everything online store. 
From acquisition to acquisition, Amazon grew not only in size but also in knowledge, capabilities 
and will to change the retail world as we know it. In 2017, Amazon acquired for the first time a 
brick-and-mortar chain, representing 472 stores of physical nature. The same type of stores that 
many speculate are going to disappear in the future ahead. If the company was not led by one of 
the most admired and influential CEO’s in the world, one could even think that this deal was a 
mistake, but Jeff Bezos has long convinced us that he has a vision for the future, and that vision 
includes the integration of online and offline stores. 
The objective of this dissertation is to propose a target company for Amazon’s quest for an 
omnichannel presence in the retail space. The beauty industry was chosen as a potential candidate 
to reinforce Amazon’s presence in the brick-and-mortar format due to its experimental nature. 
Consumers enjoy smelling perfumes, trying lipsticks and feeling the products in their hands and, 
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most importantly, they are engaged to brands that offer them this experience. Beauty specialty 
retailer Ulta offers exactly this. With over 1070 stores in the U.S. and 27,8 million people engaged 
in its loyalty program, Ulta might just be what Amazon should acquire next. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide a review of relevant academic articles on 
the topics of M&A and Valuation. Then, in Part II, I present an analysis of the retail industry and 
a focus on the beauty and personal care industry. In Part III, I introduce the companies involved in 
the proposed transaction, Amazon and Ulta, and, in Part IV, I discuss the rationale behind it. Part 
V compiles the results from the financial modelling involved in valuing each company and the 
merged entity. Finally, in Part VI, I provide some recommendations for how the transaction should 

















Part I- Literature Review 
1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.1 M&A Motives 
There are seven theories that attempt to explain why mergers occur (Trautwein, 1990). These can 
be divided into three main groups as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Theories of merger motives. Adapted from “Merger Motives and Merger Prescriptions” by F. Trautwein, 1990, 
Strategic Management Journal, 11, p.284. 
According to Trautwein (1990), the theories that are the most plausible are the Valuation, Empire 
Building and Process theories. The Empire Building theory suggests that, by engaging in mergers, 
managers are only trying to maximize their own utility, disregarding the maximization of 
shareholders’ value. The motives behind mergers can therefore be either growth maximization or 
power seeking. The Process theory aggregates different models that consider strategic decisions as 
non-comprehensively rational choices but rather outcomes of processes influenced by individuals’ 
limited information processing capacity, by organizations’ routine solutions to problems and also 
by political power. Evidence that the acquisition process is an example of a non-comprehensively 
rational decision was provided by Power’s 1983 study (as cited in Trautwein, 1990). 
Merger as rational choice










































Other theories worth mentioning are the Efficiency Theory, which regards synergies as the reason 
why firms engage in M&A (Trautwein, 1990), and the Disturbance Theory, which explains the 
occurrence of merger waves due to economic disturbances (Gort, 1969). Economic disturbances, 
such as rapid changes in technology and movements in security prices, affect both the individual 
expectations and the uncertainty involved in the valuation process that precede a merger. Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) suggest that merger waves are industry-specific and are often the 
result of restructuring activity due to industry shocks. 
1.2 Synergies 
In practice, synergies are often seen as the main driver to engage in M&A activity and the reason 
why companies pay billions of dollars in premiums (Damodaran, 2006). When two companies 
merge, they create a new and more valuable company with access to opportunities that neither of 
the two companies could have achieved independently. This increase in value is commonly referred 
to as synergy. 
1.2.1 Types of Synergies 
There are two types of synergies: Operating and Financial (Damodaran, 2006). Operating synergies 
refer to cost savings through economies of scale and to strategic advantages such as the 
combination of different functional strengths, higher growth potential in existing or new markets 
and increasing pricing power. Eckbo (1983) report, however, that horizontal mergers had no 
collusive or anticompetitive effects and that merged firms did not benefit from increased pricing 
power or significant expansion of market share.  On the other hand, Financial synergies include tax 
benefits, greater debt capacity, diversification, although mostly relevant for private businesses, and 
cash slack (Damodaran, 2006). 
1.2.2 Synergies in the Context of Multi-channel Retailing 
The concept of multi-channel retailing appeared after the proliferation of different channels through 
which consumers could interact with companies (Neslin et al., 2006). These include brick-and-
mortar stores, the internet, kiosks and catalogues, just to mention a few. More recently, as 
increasing emphasis is being put on the interaction between channels and its borders begin to fade, 
this concept has evolved to omnichannel retailing (Verhoef, Kannan, & Inman, 2015). 
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A certain type of multi-channel strategy has become predominant for exclusively online players: 
to expand into physical locations. There are numerous advantages for this, the first being the 
billboard effect that is created and that increases brand awareness and brand associations for all 
channels and drives new customers to the online channel in the long-run (Avery, Steenburgh, 
Deighton, Brierley, & Caravella, 2012). Moreover, the implementation of both a Buy Online, 
Pickup In-store (BOPIS) strategy and a cross-channel return policy encourages customers to make 
additional purchases while in store (Neslin & Shankar, 2009). Nevertheless, Avery et al. (2012) 
found no evidence of an immediate increase in the flow of new customers to the internet channel 
after the implementation of a multi-channel strategy, highlighting the importance of maintaining 
marketing activities in the short-term. 
Although cannibalization of sales is often feared, Pauwels & Neslin (2015) report that the opening 
of physical stores has no impact on internet sales and a significant negative impact on catalogue 
sales. Cannibalization will occur only if a new channel duplicates existing capabilities or offers 
superior ones, whereas complementary capabilities generate incremental demand in existing 
channels in the long-term (Avery et al., 2012). 
1.2.3 Valuing Synergies 
Damodaran (2006) proposes a three-step framework to value synergies: firstly, to compute the 
value of each firm independently, secondly the value of the combined firm without synergies, and 
lastly, the value of the combined firm with synergies. The synergy value is simply the difference 
between the value from the third and second steps. In case value of control exists, meaning the 
company is poorly managed, the value of control should be added to the target company before 
calculating the value of the combined company without synergies. The value of control is the 
difference between the status quo value of the target and the value with the intended changes in 
management. 
1.3 Acquisition Premium 
The acquisition premium represents the difference between the real value of the target company 
and the price the acquiring company is willing to pay for it. The average premium reported by 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) is 36%, while acquisitions with persistent positive returns had an average 
of 26% and acquisitions with persistent negative returns a 41% premium. 
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Managers set a bid price high enough to discourage competitive bids (Trautwein, 1990). However, 
according to Black (1989) managers overpay for target companies mainly due to their unreasonably 
high optimism and a divergence between their own interests and those of shareholders. 
1.4 Method of Payment 
Companies can use stock, cash, straight debt or a mixture, usually with convertible securities, to 
pay for a corporate acquisition. The most important motives for the choice of payment are the mode 
of acquisition and the investment opportunity set faced by the acquiring firm (Martin, 1996). 
Regarding the first, tender offers tend to be cash financed because, in this case, offers are made 
directly to the stockholders and can be subject to competing offers. Making a cash offer is the 
fastest alternative, since it is not due to the same regulatory scrutiny as a stock offers and enables 
the acquiring firm to get ahead of the competition. On the contrary, if the acquiring firm has 
valuable investment opportunities, it is more likely to use stock as a financing method for corporate 
acquisitions (Martin, 1996). With growth opportunities, managers  prefer using equity instead of 
debt because it allows for more discretion and flexibility (Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 1996). On the other 
hand, companies with poor investment opportunities benefit from issuing debt, as this will increase 
its firm value, thus they are more likely to resort to cash offers when pursuing corporate 
acquisitions (Jung et al., 1996). 
1.5  Profitability of M&A Deals 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that engaging in M&A activity generates positive gains 
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983). On average, target firm’s shareholders receive a premium return and 
bidding firm’s shareholders do not lose, meaning that, at least, they are compensated for their 
opportunity cost. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), however, find contradicting evidence, 
suggesting that acquiring firms’ shareholders lost, in aggregate, during the period of 1998 to 2001, 
around $240Bn. 
Post-acquisition returns are influenced by the mode of acquisition and form of payment (Loughran 
& Vijh, 1997). Tender offers, which are usually hostile, tend to generate higher wealth gains than 
mergers. When the form of payment is stock, the return to target shareholders is lower than a cash 
deal but still positive, however, for bidding firm’s shareholders, the return is negative (Bruner, 
2004). The form of payment conveys to the market that the acquiring firm’s stock is overvalued in 
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case a stock offer is made (Loughran & Vijh, 1997). During the period of 1970 to 1989, Loughran 
and Vijh (1997) found that cash tender offers yielded positive excess returns of 61,7%, whereas 
stock mergers earned negative excess returns of 25,0%. 
According to Sirower and Sahni (2006), companies struggle to create value for shareholders 
because a corporate acquisition requires a full up-front payment. This payment is based on the pre-
offer market value of the target firm, which, by itself, already reflects possible future performance 
improvements. Moreover, and often forgotten by managers, synergies cannot be realized without 
a cost, requiring at least an increment in the capital invested. Lastly, when competitors can easily 
replicate the benefits of the deal, the return earned by the target and acquiring firms’ stockholders 
is not significantly higher than industry peers. 
Roll (1986) presents a different hypothesis to explain the persistence of the takeover phenomenon 
despite the apparent overestimate of aggregate gains. The Hubris Hypothesis focuses on the 
individual decisions leading to a takeover, specifically the “overbearing presumption of bidders 
that their valuations are correct” (Roll, 1986, p. 200). An offer is only observed when the valuation 
of the target is higher than its market price, however, managers fail to understand that this 
difference simply represents a positive error in the valuation process and consequently, the takeover 
premium is nothing more than a random error. 
2 Valuation 
2.1 Discounted Cash Flow 
The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis has been the best practice for valuation since the 1970s 
(Luehrman, 1997). With this analysis, one can calculate the value of a business by discounting its 
expected future cash flows to present value at a discount rate. The Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) and the Adjusted Present Value (APV) offer two distinct approaches. 
2.1.1 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 







∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑐) (1) 
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where Re is the cost of equity, Rd the cost of debt, E the market value of equity, D the market value 
of debt, V is the total market value of the firm’s financing (V=E+D) and Tc is the corporate tax 
rate. 
2.1.1.1 Cost of equity 
The most commonly used model to calculate the cost of equity (Re) is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), introduced independently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). 
This model is based on the mean-variance optimization theory of Markowitz (1952) and predicts 
that the expected return of a security (E(Ri)) above the risk-free rate (Rf) is proportional to the 
systematic or non-diversifiable risk, measured by the beta (βi). The market risk premium (E(Rm)- 
Rf) component measures the excess return that investing in the market yields over a risk-free rate. 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓) (2) 
This version of the CAPM has been tested extensively in the literature. Douglas’s study of realized 
returns of common stocks from 1926 to 1960 (as cited in Jensen, 1972) reported that the average 
realized returns were not positively related to their covariance with the index of returns, which is 
inconsistent with the CAPM model. Miller and Scholes review and confirm this result, highlighting 
the econometric difficulties of estimating the relationships given by the CAPM, specifically the 
biases given by misspecifications of some components of the equation (as cited in Jensen, 1972). 
2.1.1.1.1 Beta 
Kaplan & Ruback (1996) test different measures for systematic risk, namely, the firm-based, the 
industry-based and the market-based betas. The results obtained indicate that industry and market-
based betas are the most reliable measures and consistently outperform the firm-based method. 








where βu is the unlevered beta, βe the levered beta, D and E are the market values of debt and equity 
and t the tax rate (Damodaran, 2018). 
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2.1.1.2 Cost of debt 
Damodaran (2018) suggests calculating the pre-tax cost of debt (Rd) summing a default spread to 
the risk-free rate (Rf). The default spread depends on the rating of the company’s traded bond or, 
in case, the firm is not rated, on its interest coverage ratio. The correspondence between these three 




Figure 2. Default Spread for Large Non-financial Service Companies. Reprinted from “Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and 
Default Spread” by A. Damodaran, 2018. 
 
2.1.2 Adjusted Present Value 
The APV method divides the value of a company in two components: the value of the unlevered 
firm and financing side effects, such as the present value of tax shields (PVTS) and costs of 
financial distress (Luehrman, 1997). The appropriate discount rate to value the first component is 
the unlevered cost of capital (Ru), calculated as 
𝑅𝑢 = 𝑅𝑓 +  𝛽𝑢(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) (4) 
 
Where βu is the unlevered beta and (Rm-Rf) the market risk premium (MRP). 
Myers (1974) discusses that both the risk-free rate and the unlevered cost of capital can be used to 
discount tax shields. The first should be used if book debt ratios are fixed and no uncertainty 
surrounding future tax shields exists. The second is preferred when debt to enterprise value (EV) 
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is kept constant over time. The cost of debt can be used as a discount rate as well since tax shields 
have the same uncertainty as principal and interest payments (Luehrman, 1997). 
2.2 Relative Valuation 
A Relative Valuation can be obtained from three different methods: Comparable Company, 
Comparable Transaction and Comparable Industry (Kaplan & Ruback, 1996). Although the most 
reliable methods are the Comparable Transaction and Comparable Industry Transaction, these 
might be difficult to implement if an insufficient number of comparable transactions exist. 
To ensure the peer group has the most similar companies to the company being valued, Alford 
(1992) suggests focusing on three criteria: industry, risk, as measured by total assets, and long-
term earnings growth. For the industry definition, the three digits SIC code is referred as the one 
providing the most accurate results. Kim and Ritter’s 1999 study, however, provides evidence that 
the SIC codes often misclassify companies (as cited in Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002). Thus, 
alternative industry classifications such as the Global Industry Classification Standard should be 
preferred.  
The multiples that promote greater accuracy are the forward earnings, followed by historical 
earnings, cash flow (CF) and book value of equity, and lastly, as the worst performer, sales 
multiples (Liu, Nissim, and Thomas 2002). This ranking is consistent across all industries with few 
exceptions. Kaplan & Ruback (1996) report that the Relative Valuation performs well on average 










Part II- Industry Analysis 
1 Retail Industry 
1.1 Current situation of the industry in the U.S. 
1.1.1 Market Size and Segmentation 
The U.S retail industry grew 4,5% in 2017, reaching a 5,1 trillion-dollar value (see Figure 3). 
Between 2000 and 2016, the segments that grew the most were e-commerce, with an 8% 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), and Health & Personal Care with approximately 5% 
CAGR (Deloitte, 2018c). In 2017, online sales in the U.S. reached $450Bn, representing 8,9% of 
total retail sales. 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Retail Sales and E-commerce Penetration Rate (2013-2017). Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018. 
The retailing industry can be divided in different types of retailers such as supermarkets, 
department stores, specialty retailers and e-tailers. The latter was created to define the expanding 
number of retailers that sell exclusively online.  
1.1.2 Competitive Environment 
Retailing is a highly competitive industry with low net margins. The main growth drivers are 
economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, unemployment rate, 
consumer confidence and disposable personal income, resulting in a slow market growth rate. For 
this reason, to grow, retailers need to fight each other for market share. Additionally, price elasticity 
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Share of e-commerce sales
12 
The top 10 players in the global retail industry, represented in Table 1, are all U.S. companies, 
except for the Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group. Taking into consideration only the U.S. 
market, the top 10 companies represent 30% of the market. 











1 Walmart 500,3 25,4% 1,4% 8,77 
2 CVS Health 184,8 15,5% 0,1% 11,03 
3 Amazon.com 177,9 37,1% N/A 10,38 
4 Walgreens Boots Alliance 118,2 24,7% N/A 9,93 
5 Home Depot 100,9 34,0% 7,5% 4,84 
6 Alibaba Group Holding 23,0 64,9% N/A N/A 
7 Costco Wholesale 129,0 13,3% 8,0% 11,41 
8 Lowe's Companies 68,6 34,1% 5,7% N/A 
9 Target 71,9 28,9% N/A 6,50 
10 Kroger 122,7 22,0% 2,4% N/A 
 Note. Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
1.1.3 E-commerce 
Over the years, there has been a steep increase in online shopping (see Figure 4), leading traditional 
brick-and-mortar retailers to open their own e-commerce website. Although there are pure website 
or app-based players, having a presence both in-store and online is becoming increasingly 
important. In fact, being able to interact with products was referred as the most important reason 
for shopping in-store, whereas avoiding shipping costs was the second (Deloitte, 2017).  
 
Figure 4. U.S. E-commerce sales (2013-2017). Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018. 
                                                          
























D CAGR: 14,8% 
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Walmart, the global retail leader for over 20 years with 9,8% market share in the U.S., offers both 
in-store and online shopping (Deloitte, 2018b). In addition to having its own online shopping 
website since 2000, Walmart acquired Jet.com, an American e-commerce start-up, in 2016. 
Amazon, the largest online shopping platform in the world, with a 43,5% market share in the U.S. 
e-commerce market in 2016 (eMarketer, 2017a), acquired in 2017 the brick-and-mortar chain 
Whole Foods Market. This acquisition was a turning point not only for Amazon, since it was a 
significant investment in physical stores, but also to the food and grocery stores industry. 
In fact, over the last couple of years, the retailing industry has seen a spread of omnichannel 
retailers. An omnichannel service enables consumers to shop quickly and smoothly, anytime and 
anywhere with an integrated returns service. One of the key developments in this field has been the 
BOPIS service. This service fully integrates physical stores and e-commerce websites and allows 
retailers to drive traffic to physical stores. Since 2015, the adoption of the BOPIS service increased 
44%, with 40% of consumers referring that they chose this service to avoid home delivery 
(Scottsdale, 2017). 
1.2 The future of the Retail industry 
1.2.1 Growth Projections 
For 2018, the retail industry is forecasted to continue growing due to confident spending boosted 
by rising incomes, strong labour markets and, overall, a growing U.S. economy. The National 
Retail Federation forecasts a growth between 3,8% and 4,4% for 2018 retail sales. Regarding online 
sales, the predictions are substantially higher, with 10 to 12% growth rates (Smith, 2018). 
1.2.2 M&A Activity 
Deal activity is expected to increase in 2018, mainly due to the U.S. tax reform. Additionally, M&A 
or strategic partnerships with technology companies, as alternatives to Research & Development 
(R&D), will enable companies to integrate the latest technologies in their businesses, in the form 
of improved products and services or enhanced customer experience. 
1.2.3 Trends 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has several applications in retail, from influencing and anticipating 
purchases to guiding customers’ shopping experiences in a highly personalized manner. One 
example that has already been implemented in many retailers’ websites is Chatbot, a computer 
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program that mimics conversations between people and takes the role of an AI-powered shopping 
assistant. Apart from answering costumers’ queries, in the future, Chatbots should be able to 
anticipate the behaviour of users and make smart purchase recommendations. 
In online shopping, the biggest trend right now is social commerce. Facebook and Instagram are 
the platforms of choice when it comes to shopping directly on social media platforms, with 
Facebook accounting for 81% of the total 2016 purchases (Baird & Rosenblum, 2018). 
Approximately 56% of consumers follow brands on social media with the purpose of viewing 
products (Chahal, 2016). And only one-third of U.S. social media users have never made purchases 
directly via social (eMarketer, 2017b). 
1.2.4 Key Challenges 
In a digital world, consumers are highly influenced by what they see online. In fact, 55% of online 
consumers search for reviews and recommendations on the internet before buying a product 
(KPMG, 2017). In physical stores, the trend is similar, as digital interactions influence 56 cents of 
every dollar spent in stores (Deloitte, 2016). Smartphones play a big role in consumers’ shopping 
journey and have fulfilled the need for constant information in-store and for making better 
purchasing decisions (Deloitte, 2018a). This reality carries responsibility to companies in terms of 
what content they post online and how to better engage with consumers using mobile-apps. 
As online shopping grows at an astonishing speed, traditional retailers face increasing challenges. 
In 2017, the number of store closings in the U.S. reached the highest number since 2009 (KMPG, 
2018). Department stores and specialty retailers, such as J. C. Penney, CVS and Staples, fall among 
the ones with the highest store closings, mainly because of shrinking mall traffic and 
reconfiguration of store networks (Fung Global Retail & Technology, 2018). In 2016 and 2017, 
store closings exceeded the number of new stores, yet a selected number of retailers have 
aggressively expanded during this period. These are from the categories of fast fashion, sportswear 
and beauty. 
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2 Beauty and Personal Care Industry 
2.1 Current situation of the industry in the U.S. 
2.1.1 Market Size and Segmentation 
The beauty and personal care industry in the U.S. grew 4% in 2016, reaching a value of $93Bn, 
according to Euromonitor International data. Globally, this industry is valued in $445Bn. 
In terms of products, this industry can be segmented in: Skin Care, Makeup, Fragrances, Bath & 
Shower, and others. In terms of market share, Hair Care and Skin Care are the segments with the 
highest revenues, with approximately 24% market share each. The beauty and personal care 
industry can be segmented in terms of distribution channel as well. Grocery stores and Drugstores 
are the most popular channels with a share of 22% and 15% each (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. U.S. shares in the beauty and personal care industry (2016). Adapted from Channel Shifts in US Beauty Retailing, by 
Fung Global Retail & Technology, 2017, p.5 
Focusing on the Makeup segment, preferences change, and beauty specialty stores capture the 
largest share of the market, 21% in 2016. Department stores, once the leading channel for makeup, 
have been losing market share since 2013, to beauty specialty stores and online retailers (Fung 
Global Retail & Technology, 2017b). 
2.1.2 Competitive Environment 
The beauty and personal care industry is a highly fragmented market with more than 70,000 
purchase locations in the U.S. The retailers where U.S. consumers shop most frequently are 
















Figure 6. Leading beauty and personal care retailers in the U.S. 
Walmart is the undisputable leader for beauty and personal care products, followed by CVS and 
Target. Beauty specialty retailers, namely Ulta and Sephora, are more attractive to Millennials than 
to older generations mainly due to their shopping experience, selection of products and quality 
(Fung Global Retail & Technology, 2017b). 
The smaller firms in the market are the ones that innovate the most. That is why big players often 
acquire young entrepreneurial companies. Recently, innovation has been one of the key drivers of 
M&A activity, with the acquisition of Modiface.com2 by L’Oréal a good example. Another catalyst 
of the beauty M&A has been the access to new distribution channels.  Department store Macy’s 
acquired the beauty and spa chain Bluemercury to gain access to a new channel while adding new 
dimensions to its current offering and levering its expertise in omnichannel retailing. 
The e-commerce channel is of particular interest when pursuing beauty M&A. Target’s acquisition 
of DermStore, an online beauty retailer, highlights the importance of expanding online market 
shares and reaching more consumers. 
                                                          



































In 2016, only 9% of the U.S. beauty sales came from online shopping. The e-commerce penetration 
rate is significantly different depending on the product category, as described in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. U.S. E-commerce sales and penetration rate by segment (2015). Adapted from Beauty and the E-Commerce Beast, by 
A.T. Kearney, 2017, p.3 
According to an A.T. Kearney (2017) survey, 69% of consumers refer Amazon as one of the 
websites where they search and buy beauty and personal care products (see Figure 8). Sephora and 
Ulta appear next on the list mainly due to the selection and quality of its products. From 2014 to 
2016, Ulta was the store that increased its ranking the most, jumping from the ninth to the third 
position.  
 
Figure 8. Most used websites to search and buy beauty and personal care products. Adapted from Beauty and the E-Commerce 
Beast (p. 7), by A.T. Kearney, 2017. 























































2.2 The future of the Beauty and Personal Care industry 
2.2.1 Growth Projections 
The global beauty and personal care market should reach $429,8Bn by 2022, registering a 4,3% 
CAGR between 2016 and 2022 (Allied Market Resarch, 2016). Focusing on the U.S., the industry 
is expected to continue growing, with Euromonitor International estimating the 2016-2021 CAGR 
to be between 2 and 3% across all segments. This growth is fuelled by a rising GDP, a 2,3% and 
2,2% growth are forecasted in 2018 and 2019 respectively, and by an increase in the per capita 
disposable income, allowing consumers to spend more money across all product categories 
(OECD, 2017). A particular driver for the industry is the higher spending of Generation Z 
consumers in beauty and personal care products as they become financially independent. This is 
regarded as the most self-conscious generation ever due to excessive social media usage (Fung 
Global Retail & Technology, 2017c). 
2.2.2 M&A Activity 
Fung Global Retail & Technology (2017) study forecasts that, in the coming years, M&A activity 
will be motivated by the demands of Generation Z consumers for pure and natural ingredients and 
cruelty-free products. Multi-brand companies such as L’Oréal and Coty, will need to adapt their 
brand portfolios accordingly and will probably engage in M&A to acquire smaller specialized 
companies. 
2.2.3 Trends 
Recently, the beauty industry has seen a rising demand, primarily from Millennials and Generation 
Z consumers, for online quality beauty content. According to a study, 65% of millennials prefer 
watching their favourite Youtuber than listening to an in-store beauty advisor (Mao, 2017). In fact, 
social media, as a whole, has seen its influence on shopping rise, whether it is with photos of 
influencers showing products in Instagram or videos explaining how to use them in YouTube. 
Regarding the latter, between 2015 and 2016, the number of beauty videos on the platform 
increased by 200% (Fung Global Retail & Technology, 2017c). To react to this shift of influences, 
companies have begun to partner with bloggers and Youtubers to create digital content. MAC 
Cosmetics, for instance, partnered up with ten Instagram beauty influencers in 2017 to promote its 
new released lipstick shades. 
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Augmented reality can have several applications in the beauty industry. Some companies have 
already started using this technology to engage with consumers in a more unique way, but this 
trend is expected to grow as we move closer to a fully digital world. MAC Cosmetics recently 
launched an in-store augmented reality mirror such that customers can immediately see how the 
products look on themselves without having to physically try them. 
2.2.4 Key Challenges 
The beauty industry is still very attached to the in-store experience, due to the experimental nature 
of its products. As long as there is no alternative to trying products physically in-stores, e-tailers 
will have difficulties in capturing the majority of the market. A disruptive approach to this problem 
was implemented by Birchbox, an online beauty subscription company, that sends every month 
personalized samples to customers such that they can try out the products before engaging in a 
purchase online. In 2016, the company recorded 125% year-on-year revenue growth. 
Regarding the online beauty and personal care market, there is still much left to do in terms of 
building relationships with customers. A.T. Kearney (2017) reported that 67% of consumers use 
four or more websites when searching for and buying products. The e-commerce market for this 
industry is growing fast, but if companies are not able to hook consumers, then this increase in 
number of transactions might just go to the website that offers the best prices. In this sense, physical 
stores have a clear advantage as they can provide beauty advice, give in-store workshops or host 













Part III- Company Profiles 
1 Amazon 
1.1 Overview of the company 
Amazon is the largest e-commerce company in the world present in 15 countries including the 
U.S., Canada, Mexico and India. It was founded in 1994 by Jeffrey Bezos, who currently is the 
President, CEO and Chairman of the group. Although the company started as an online bookstore, 
it later diversified and now offers an extensive range of products including electronic gadgets, food 
supplies, clothing, beauty products, furniture, and much more. In 2016, Amazon’s market share in 
the U.S. e-commerce industry was 43,5% and about 4% in the retail industry. 
Amazon.com is a market place where Amazon sells its electronic devices such as Kindle, Echo and 
FireTV and its private label products under the brand AmazonBasics, but it is also a market place 
for third-party sellers to display and sell their products. Amazon also provides advertisement 
solutions and fulfilment services, which consists on storing, shipping and customer service, to 
third-party sellers. 
For a long time, Amazon was present exclusively online but, in 2015, it opened its first physical 
store in Seattle, a bookstore. Currently, the company has 13 bookstores across the U.S. and 31 
pickup locations. In 2017, with the acquisition of Whole Foods, Amazon added 472 physical stores 
to its portfolio. 
Apart from retail, Amazon has expanded into entertainment with Amazon Studios and the 
streaming platforms Amazon Music and Prime Video, and also into cloud services. Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) provides data storage and data management tools for more than 1 million clients. 
Even though this was not part of Amazon’s core strategy, the company has become the market 
leader in cloud services with approximately 30% market share. 
Amazon’s strategy has always been very customer-centric, which is reflected in low prices, 
convenient services and ongoing innovation. The Amazon Prime subscription service was 
introduced to provide costumers special benefits such as exclusive discounts, two-day free shipping 
and free access to all kindle books, with new benefits being frequently added.  
21 
One of Amazon’s key competitive advantages is, without doubt, its technology. The company has 
been able to put machine learning to practice in a convenient and valuable way to customers. Alexa, 
the cloud-based AI assistant on Amazon Echo devices, can play music as requested, control smart-
house systems, deliver fashion and beauty advice, among others. Another innovation was the 
opening of AmazonGo, the first supermarket in the world where customers can walk in and out 
without having to stand in a check-out line. 
1.2 Structure of Ownership and Subsidiaries 
Amazon’s largest shareholder is its founder Jeffrey Bezos, with 16,3% shares outstanding (Figure 
9). The remaining shareholders are mainly investment managers and brokerage firms, 
predominantly from the U.S. and U.K. 
 
Figure 9. Amazon’s Ownership Structure. Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
Amazon has 40 subsidiaries from different fields: audio books, grocery stores, video distribution, 
among others (see full list on Appendix A). Most of its subsidiaries were acquired by Amazon, 
such as Souq for $583Mm and Whole Foods for $13,2Bn, the largest acquisition the company has 
ever made. 
1.3 Financial Statement Analysis 
1.3.1 Revenues and Costs 
Amazon presents its quarter and annual results segmented in three areas: North America, 
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products and subscriptions in the U.S., Canada and Mexico websites, while the International 
segment refers to all other internationally-based websites. The AWS segment consists of the global 
sales associated with computation, storage and database services. 
 
Figure 10. Amazon’s revenue breakdown by segment (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
As illustrated in Figure 10, the North America segment is responsible for more than half Amazon’s 
revenues. International revenues, although having increased in absolute terms, saw its relative 
importance to Amazon decrease since 2013. AWS has been the segment with the fastest growth 
rate, with a 43% revenue growth rate from 2016 to 2017. 
 
Figure 11. Amazon’s operating costs breakdown (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
In terms of costs, the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), from 2016 to 2017, increased significantly in 
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Technology & Content costs are an important figure for Amazon since it covers R&D costs as well 
as AWS and other technology infrastructure costs. In 2017, these accounted for 13% of total 
operating costs and amounted to $22.620Mm. Marketing expenses saw a 40% increase from 2016 
to 2017, mainly due to higher spending on online marketing channels and television advertising. 
1.3.2 Profitability 
Being a low margin, high volume business, Amazon has historically maintained an operating 
margin ranging from 0,2 to 3,1%, as illustrated in Figure 12. In terms of net income margin, its 
value averaged 0,8% over the last five years, with net income being negative only in 2014. 
 
Figure 12. Evolution of Amazon’s Operating Results. Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
1.3.3 Key Metrics 
In terms of profitability, Amazon is slightly below the industry median for gross margin and 
operating margin but at the industry level for net income margin (refer to Table 2). Regarding 
operating metrics, inventory turnover is slightly higher than the industry, which reflects strong 




























Total Revenue Total Operating Expense
Operating Margin
24 
Table 2. Amazon’s key metrics evolution and comparison to industry median (2015-2017) 
  2015 2016 2017 Industry Median 
Profitability     
Gross Margin 33,0% 35,1% 37,1% 48,5% 
Operating Margin 2,1% 3,1% 2,3% 3,2% 
Net Margin 0,6% 1,8% 1,3% 1,3% 
Operating     
Inventory Turnover 7,7 8,1 8,1 7,7 
ROIC 2,2% 7,0% 4,0% N/A 
Liquidity     
Current Ratio 1,1 1,0 1,0 1,5 
Interest Coverage Ratio 4,9 8,6 4,8 1,9 
Cash Cycle (Days) (27,5) (30,9) (30,9) (1,8) 
Leverage     
Debt/Equity 1,1 1,0 1,6 0,48 
Earning Power     
Asset Turnover 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,7 
ROE 4,9% 14,5% 9,6% 5,4% 
Dividend Yield 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,4% 
Note. Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
Focusing on liquidity, the company has healthy ratios, with an interest coverage ratio well above 
industry peers and an advantageous cash cycle. Cash cycles are usually negative for online retailers 
because these can pay to suppliers after receiving the payment from customers, hence inventory 
levels do not have to be very high. 
Amazon has historically been more leveraged in book value than industry peers. In 2017, the debt-
to-equity ratio reached its maximum level following the Whole Foods acquisition. In market 
values, Amazon has a debt-to-equity ratio of 5,7%. 
 


























Amazon is known for its focus on long-term growth instead of earnings. In fact, the company’s 
earnings per share (EPS) have been low since 2013 and reached a negative value in 2014 (Figure 
13). However, from 2016 onwards, the company has been able to increase its earnings and achieve 
a return on equity (ROE) well above the industry median. Nevertheless, Amazon has never paid 
dividends to its shareholders, contrary to industry peers, which have an average 2,4% dividend 
yield. 
1.4 Stock Market Performance 
Amazon went public in 1997, at an Initial Public Offering (IPO) price of $16 on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange under the ticker AMZN. 
 
Figure 14. AMZN price evolution on NASDAQ (1998-2018). Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
The stock price has considerably increased over the last five years, as illustrated on Figure 14. This 
trend was also seen in the Internet and Direct Marketing Retail industry, however, from 2008 
onwards, Amazon began significantly outperforming peers (Figure 15). As of 8th March 2018, 96% 





























Figure 15. AMZN cumulative returns against main indices (1998-2018). Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
2 Ulta 
2.1 Overview of the company 
Ulta is the U.S. leading beauty specialty retailer with 1.074 retail stores across 48 states. The 
company was founded in 1990 under the unique proposition of All Things Beauty. All in One 
Place.™. At that time, prestige, mass, and salon products were sold at distinct channels and Ulta 
developed a new specialty retail concept, where customers could make all their beauty purchases 
in a convenient and welcoming shopping environment. Almost 30 years later, the company 
management continues to envision Ulta as the most-loved beauty destination and has a core strategy 
of offering relevant, innovative, and exclusive products that excite guests. Ulta is best known for 
its industry-leading loyalty program called Ultamate Rewards with 27,8 million active users as of 
2017. 
Ulta offers over 20.000 products from 500 mass and prestige brands across all beauty categories, 
including private label products. The company focuses on four main product categories: makeup; 
skincare, bath and fragrance; haircare products and styling tools; others, such as nail products and 
accessories. Ulta’s market share in the U.S. beauty market was 6,4% in 2017. 
One of the company’s key competitive advantage is its distinctive in-store experience and 
personalized service, which is achieved with 950 square feet per store dedicated to salon services. 
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services. In the highly fragmented U.S. salon services market, Ulta captured a 0,5% market share 
in 2017. 
In addition to physical stores, Ulta also offers online shopping to its customers which already 
represents 9,7% of total revenues. In 2017, e-commerce sales increased 64,7% mainly due to digital 
marketing initiatives and the enhancement of the chain’s mobile app and mobile website. 
In the second quarter of 2017, the Store 2 Door program was piloted in 40 physical stores and later 
extended to all stores following its success. This program enables customers who are in physical 
stores to place online orders which are then delivered to their houses and has led to an increase in 
omnichannel customers. 
Ulta has active relationships with over 400 vendor partners, being the Estée Lauder Companies, 
L’Oréal and Shiseido the most important ones for the chain. In 2016 and 2017, the top ten vendor 
partners accounted for 64% of total net sales. 
2.2 Structure of Ownership and Subsidiaries 
Ulta’s ownership is mainly composed of investment managers, around 90,4% of all outstanding 
shares. Its largest institutional shareholders are The Vanguard Group and Capital World Investors 
(Figure 16). Current directors and executive officers as a group account for 5,6% of total 
ownership. 
 
Figure 16. Ulta’s Ownership Structure. Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
The subsidiaries of Ulta Beauty Inc include Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance Inc, Ulta Beauty 














2.3 Financial Statement Analysis 
2.3.1 Revenues and Costs 
In 2017, Ulta’s revenues increased 21,2% to $5.885Mm (Figure 17), mainly fuelled by an e-
commerce growth of 64,7% and the opening of 102 new stores. E-commerce has been rapidly 
gaining a higher share of the company’s revenues, from 3,6% in 2013 to 9,7% in 2017. 
 
Figure 17. Ulta’s revenue breakdown by segment (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
The company’s cost structure is very stable, with COGS being the most representative cost with 
an average 74,3% weight on total operating costs. Selling, general and administrative expenses 
(SG&A) includes various costs such as payroll, advertising, stock-based compensation and 
corporate office occupancy costs. Advertising expense, in particular, decreased from 6,0% of 
operating costs in 2013 to 5,1% in 2017 (Figure 18). 
 
 






































Pre-opening expenses include store set-up labour, management and employee training, and grand-
opening advertising expenses related to the period before a new, remodelled or relocated store is 
open to the public. In 2017, 102 new stores opened to the public, including 20 stores in new markets 
(Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19. Ulta’s store count (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
2.3.2 Profitability 
The company’s net income margin increased from approximately 8,4% in 2016 to 9,4% in 2017 
(Figure 20). This increase was primarily due to a $350Mm increase in gross profit and to a 
significant decrease in income tax. Operating margin decreased from 13,5% to 13,3% in 2017 due 
to intense marketing and merchandising strategies. 
 
Figure 20. Evolution of Ulta’s Operating Results (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
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2.3.3 Key Metrics 
Table 3 shows the company’s key metrics and how they compare to the industry. Comparable Store 
Sales (Comps) growth was 11,0% in 2017, which included a 6,7% increase in transactions and a 
4,3% increase in average receipt, and positively compares to the industry median. 
In terms of profitability, gross margin is slightly below the industry, taking an average value of 
35,4% versus the industry’s value of 37,6%. Operating margin, on the other hand, is almost twice 
the value of the industry. 
The specialty retailing industry is characterized by low leverage values, with a median 0,3 debt-to-
equity ratio. Ulta stands below the industry, with no outstanding borrowings since 2010. 
Table 3. Ulta’s key metrics evolution and comparison to industry median (2015-2017) 
  2015 2016 2017 Industry Median 
Retail         
Comps Growth 11,8% 15,8% 11,0% 1.4% 
Inventory per Sq Ft ($Mm) 82,6 91,9 97,0 50,6 
Net Sales per Retail Sq Ft ($Mm) 450,0 504,0 548,0 340,0  
Number of Stores 874 974 1.074  1.077  
Profitability         
Gross Margin 35,3% 36,0% 35,6% 37,6%  
Operating Margin 12,9% 13,5% 13,3% 6,7%  
Net Margin 8,2% 8,4% 10,1% 3,9%  
Operating         
Inventory Turnover 3,8  3,6  3,7  3,9  
ROIC 18,5% 21,2% 27,7% N/A  
Liquidity         
Current Ratio 3,5 2,9 2,6 1,6 
Cash Cycle (Days) 74,0  79,0  77,2  62,7  
Leverage         
Assets/Equity 1,6 1,7 1,6 2,2  
Debt/Equity 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3  
Earning Power         
Asset Turnover 1,9 2,0 2,2 1,9 
ROE 23,8% 27,4% 35,7% 15,0%  
Dividend Yield 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,9  
Note. Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
Basic EPS registered a 23% CAGR during from 2013 to 2017, while ROE was consistently above 
the industry median of 15,0% and reaching 35,7% on 2017 (Figure 21). The company has never 
paid dividends, however, it engages in frequent share repurchase programs and, in 2017, 
$367,6Mm worth of stocks were repurchased. 
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Figure 21. Ulta’s Basic EPS and ROE evolution (2013-2017). Retrieved from Company’s Annual Reports 
2.4 Stock Market Performance 
ULTA was listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange for the first time in October 2007 at an IPO 
price of $18. The evolution of the stock price since then is presented in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. ULTA price evolution on NASDAQ (Nov 2013- Dec 2017). Retrieved from Thomson Reuters Eikon, 2018 
In the first three years, Ulta performed below the industry average, however, this trend inverted in 
2010 and since then, Ulta has consistently outperformed the industry and the S&P500. From June 
to November 2017, the stock suffered a 36% loss due to investor sell-off and as a result of second 
quarter earnings lower than expected and concerns regarding the beauty industry (Figure 23). As 
of 27th April 2018, 69% of the analyst coverage had a buy or strong buy recommendation (Reuters, 
2018). 





















































































ULTA S&P 500 S&P 500 Specialty Retail
33 
Part IV- Deal Rationale 
For the past 20 years, Amazon has completed 85 M&A transactions, involving companies 
from a broad set of activities such as transportation & logistics, publishing and consumer 
products. These acquisitions have reinforced the ultimate objective of Amazon of being an 
everything store. More recently, the bold entrance into the grocery market, with the acquisition 
of Whole Foods, announced Amazon’s intention of becoming an omnichannel player . 
Many have speculated on what the next large Amazon’s acquisition might be. With estimated 
global annual sales of $445Bn, the beauty industry could be a potential target to expand the 
company’s offline presence. In 2017, Amazon’s luxury beauty segment experienced a 47% 
growth rate, while mass cosmetics jumped as much as 60%. With clear signs that Amazon’s 
customers are increasingly searching for beauty offers, it is imperative that the company 
expands its brand portfolio and works on customer loyalty.  
The in-store experience in the beauty industry is of major importance. Consumers like to touch and 
experiment with products before buying and, most importantly, they feel engaged with retailers 
which provide them a unique shopping experience and compelling loyalty programs. Amazon’s 
current offering, in this sense, is very limited and until the e-commerce leader adjusts to the 
particularities of this segment, it will not be able to capture a large share of the market. 
Acquiring Ulta, the leading beauty specialty retailer in the U.S. with an unmatched shopping 
experience, appears to be the best solution to strengthen Amazon’s position in the industry. Ulta’s 
customer base is very loyal and mainly composed of the so-called Beauty Enthusiasts, which 
account for 77% of all dollars spent on beauty products according to the company’s segmentation 
study. Ulta’s customers also appear to be open to online shopping, proven by a strong e-commerce 
revenue growth of around 65% in 2017 and the popularity of the try-on app Glamlab in which 
customers can digitally test the wide selection of products sold online. There is little overlap 
between Ulta’s and Amazon’s customers, as indicated by a report from Fung Global Retail & 
Technology (2017). Amazon’s main purchase drivers for beauty related products is price while 
Ulta’s are selection and quality, indicating that high income individuals prefer to shop at the brick-
and-mortar chain. It is also interesting to note that the characteristics of Ulta’s customers make 
them potential Amazon Echo device users, especially after the introduction of the Echo Show with 
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the newly released Let's Get Ready skill, which gives personalized step-by-step video makeup 
tutorials depending on events, skin colour, hair colour, among others. 
Moreover, valuable customer insights could be gathered to better understand purchasing behaviour 
in this industry and utilized to improve the online shopping experience for beauty products. On the 
other hand, Ulta’s large network of physical stores across the U.S. would allow Amazon to extend 
its pick-up locations and thus, take advantage of a BOPI strategy that would lower shipping costs. 



















Part V- Valuation 
A) Valuation of independent companies 
1 Amazon 
To value Amazon, a sum-of-the-parts valuation is going to be performed. The company was 
divided in two segments: Retail and AWS. The first consists of Amazon’s e-commerce business, 
subscription services and physical stores retail business from North American and International 
operations. The second segment, AWS, is related to the company’s cloud services platform. 
Corporate costs and assets are valued separately and added at the end to the enterprise value of 
Retail and AWS. 
Amazon has been able to sustain a revenue growth rate above 20% for the last 15 years with no 
signs of slowing down. Since the company is clearly not near a sustainable long-term growth rate, 
the forecast length was set to ten years, with an initial period of continuous high growth from 2018 
to 2023 followed by a four-year period of approximation to industry averages. The first period is 
forecasted in higher detail. 
1.1 Forecasts 
1.1.1 Retail Revenues 
Revenue forecasts for this segment were based on the number of Prime members, due to their 
importance for the company. In 2017, U.S. Prime members accounted for 63% of total customers 
and had an average spending between $1.000 and $1.300, while non-members spent, on average, 
$729 during the year.  
Since the company does not disclose the number of Prime members in none of the countries where 
the service is available, this number was estimated based on historical values for subscription 
services sales and the Prime membership fee per country (Appendix B). For future years, the 
number of members is expected to increase due to the management’s objective of capturing more 
members as these tend to spend significantly more on average (Figure 24). 
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Figure 24. Estimated number of Prime members (2014-2023) 
The number of Prime members in the U.S. is near its saturation point because penetration rates in 
the highest income households are already quite high, at 82% for households with more than $112k 
and 67% for households between $68k and $112k. Therefore, the majority of the growth in Prime 
subscribers is expected to come from Amazon’s international operations, specifically India and 
Brazil. The company has been growing its presence in India for the past years, surpassing India’s 
e-commerce leader, Flipkart, in 2016 in terms of sales. According to a report from Morgan Stanley, 
online retail in India is forecasted to grow to $200Bn by 2026, representing a growth of 1.200% 
since 2016. Additionally, the company has recently invested R$97,5Mm in Brazil to expand 
operations in the country. 
To better estimate Amazon’s future Retail revenues, a detailed forecast was performed for each of 
the company’s sources of revenue: 
• E-commerce Business (Appendix C) 
• Subscription Services (Appendix D) 
• Physical Stores (Appendix E) 
The relative importance of each source of revenue for Amazon’s Retail business is expected to 
change over time, as suggested by Figure 25. Subscription services are going to become Amazon’s 
second largest segment in Retail by 2023, when they are forecasted to account for 10% of revenues. 
This goes in line with video streaming increasing popularity and the company’s investment in video 







2014 2015 2016 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E
U.S. U.K. Germany
Japan Rest of the World
37 
 
Figure 25. Retail Historical and Forecasted Revenues (2013-2023) 
1.1.2 Amazon Web Services Revenues  
Estimates for AWS revenue were obtained from a combination of the total cloud market growth 
and the evolution of AWS market share. At the end of the fourth quarter of 2017, Amazon 
announced three new large enterprise customers fully integrated in AWS cloud and ten companies 
starting to move its databases to the cloud. 
AWS has been the largest cloud platform in the world for several years and has revenues larger 
than its two closest competitors combined, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud. Nevertheless, in 
the fourth quarter of 2017, the year-over-year growth of Microsoft Azure far surpassed that of 
AWS, with an acceleration of 98% versus 45% (KeyBanc Capital Markets, 2018). 
The future of the cloud market seems to be a battle of automation rather than features. So far, 
companies have fought on the basis of new features, with AWS releasing 1.000 feature 
enhancements annually for the past two years. However, in 2018, automation seems to be the next 
competitive advantage that cloud providers seek. For AWS, this shift has several advantages such 
as cost savings, less time deployed by developers and competitive differentiation from other 
companies. 
Due to the positive prospects of the industry and capabilities of AWS, revenues are estimated to 
continue growing but at a slower pace. Between 2018 and 2023, a 22% CAGR is estimated and 
AWS market share is expected to increase until 40% (Appendix F). In the following period, 
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1.1.3 Operating Costs 
According to the company’s financial reports, the costs associated to the Retail segment are COGS, 
Fulfilment, Marketing and Technology and Content, whereas AWS operational costs are mainly 
Technology and Content. Corporate costs such as payroll, rent, professional fees and litigation 
costs are recorded under the label General and Administrative and allocated to the Corporate 
segment. 
COGS is forecasted to decrease mainly due to the incorporation of Whole Foods. As discussed in 
Part II, BOPIS is increasingly popular among online customers and, with this acquisition, Amazon 
gained access to 472 physical store locations, which the company can use to deliver products to its 
customers while decreasing its overall shipping costs. Both fulfilment and marketing costs are 
expected to remain quite stable, while Technology and Content costs for Retail are modelled to 
increase as a percentage of revenues in comparison to 2017, since it is the management’s intentions 
to add more computer scientists, designers and software and hardware engineers. The evolution of 
all costs associated with the Retail segment are presented in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Retail Forecasted Operating Results (2018-2027) 
In terms of AWS costs, these are forecasted to grow at a slower pace, as efficiency increases and 
economies of scale appear. In terms of operating margin, a slight decrease is expected in 2018, 
following the previous downwards trend, but it should improve rapidly as high margin products 
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Figure 27. AWS Forecasted Operating Results (2018-2027) 
1.1.4 Working Capital 
Please refer to Appendix G. 
1.1.5 D&A, CAPEX and PP&E acquired under capital and finance leases 
Please refer to Appendix H. 
1.1.6 Debt Schedule and Capital and Finance Lease Repayments 
Please refer to Appendix I. 
1.2 Cost of capital 
Three costs of capital were computed, one for each segment, and the results are presented in Table 
4. The WACC for the corporate segment was computed as a weighted average of the Retail and 
AWS WACC and assumes a value of 7,94%. 
Table 4. WACC calculation for Amazon’s segments 
 Retail AWS 
Rf 2,83% 2,83% 
Beta 1,09 0,95  
MRP 5,50% 5,50% 
Re 8,81% 8,05% 
Rd 3,73% 3,73% 
Net Debt to EV 9,59% 8,77% 
Equity to EV 90,41% 91,23% 
Tax rate 21,00% 21,00% 
WACC 8,25% 7,60% 
 
The risk-free rate is the 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield and the MRP was set at 5,50%, the value 
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the re-levered industry beta, obtained from the median unlevered betas of a restricted peer group 
formed for each segment through a cluster analysis (Appendix J).  
The 3,73% cost of debt results from an A+ credit rating on long-term debt issued on April 2018 
and the corresponding 0,9% default spread rate. 
Finally, the target capital structure was set to be the industry average for each segment and the tax 
rate was assumed to be 21%, the level set by the 2017 Tax Act in the U.S. 
1.3 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
To compute the enterprise value of Amazon at the end of 2017, the Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
(FCFF) was computed for each segment, based on the individual and consolidated financial 
statements (Appendix K). In order to obtain a more accurate estimate for the fair value of the 
company, the value of PP&E acquired under capital and finance leases was also discounted from 
NOPLAT, as recommended in the company’s annual report. 
Two scenarios were tested for the terminal value growth rate. Scenario 1 is the high growth 
scenario, with a growth rate of 5,56%, and portrays confidence in Amazon’s unique competitive 
advantages, focus on long-term growth and constant disruptive innovations. Scenario 2 is less 
optimistic with a moderate growth of 4,50% and is intended to provide a reality check. 
The results obtained with this method are detailed in Appendix L and summarized in Table 5, 
where the upside/downside is given relative to the share price of 21st May 2018. 
Table 5. Amazon’s DCF Valuation 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Retail EV 568.360 409.344 
AWS EV 515.984 343.404 
Corporate EV (249.773) (186.196) 
Total EV 834.571 566.552 
(-) Net Debt 13.061 13.061 
Equity Value 821.510 553.491 
Number Diluted Shares 493 493 
Fair Share Price (USD) 1.666 1.123 
Upside (Downside) 5,1% -29,2% 
                          Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
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1.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed with a 0,3-p.p. range in the WACC of Retail and AWS and a 
4-value range in the terminal value growth rate containing the two rates previously tested. The 
impact on the enterprise value of each segment is presented in Figure 28. 
 
WACC Retail 









4,00% 398.669  361.712  329.850  
4,50% 455.795  409.344  370.026  
5,00% 532.314  471.652  421.533  






Figure 28. Amazon’s DCF Sensitivity Analysis on each segment’s EV ($Mm) 
1.4 Relative Valuation 
For the Relative Valuation, the forward multiples EV to Revenue, EV to EBITDA, and EV to 
Operating CF were obtained from the same peer group as beta (Appendix M). The results for each 
segment are presented in Figure 29 and Figure 30. 
 
Figure 29. Summary of Retail Relative Valuation 
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4,00% 331.511  297.059  268.047  
4,50% 388.903  343.404  306.090  
5,00% 471.229  407.560  357.243  
5,56% 618.510  515.984  439.922  
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Figure 30. Summary of AWS Relative Valuation 
The enterprise value of the consolidated firm under this method is $663.121Mm and the fair share 
price $1.319, a 16,8% downside relative to the market share price. Please find the detailed 
calculation in Appendix N. 
1.5 Summary 
Figure 31 summarizes the results from the valuation methods used against the 12-month price target 
and 52-week trading range (Reuters, 2018). 
 
Figure 31. Summary of Amazon’s share price per valuation method and market comparison 
The enterprise value of Amazon hereafter is assumed to be $834.571Mm and its fair share price 
$1.666, the result of the DCF model Scenario 1. The relative valuation was not considered to yield 
a good estimation primarily because Amazon possesses a significant competitive advantage over 
its peers in both of its segments, as discussed in Part III, and reinforced by the fact the company’s 
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multiples are the maximum from the peer group in most cases. The DCF Scenario 1 was preferred 
over Scenario 2 due to its proximity to the current stock price and assuming efficient capital 
markets. 
2 Ulta 
To value Ulta, a DCF analysis is going to be performed for the next five years of operations 
followed by a perpetuity starting in 2023. Additionally, a Relative Valuation is going to be 
developed to provide a base of comparison. 
2.1 Forecasts 
2.1.1 Revenues 
Revenues were estimated for physical stores and e-commerce business aggregately since the firm 
discloses its Comps growth including internet sales for a better reflection of the business. Firstly, 
the number of new and closed stores per year was forecasted based on the company’s management 
prediction that the chain will reach 1.400 stores in the next few years, opening 100 new stores on 
2018 (Figure 32). Secondly, an estimation was made regarding future comps growth, following 
management’s expectations of strong e-commerce growth in the short-term, but anticipating an 
eventual decline to industry comps growth rate by 2021 (Appendix O). 
 
Figure 32.  Historical and Forecasted Store Count and Average Sales per Square Foot (2013-2022) 
2.1.2 Operating Costs 
Ulta’s management team foresees an increase in COGS between 0,5 and 0,7 p.p. for 2018 and, 
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Operating margin is also predicted to slightly decrease in 2018 and stabilize in 2020 at 11,8% 
(Figure 33). 
SG&A were kept constant at 22,0% of net sales and employee stock-based compensation was 
maintained at 1,8% of SG&A, the 3-year historical average. 
Pre-opening expenses were forecasted according to the predicted number of new, remodelled and 
relocated stores and the 2017 expense per store. Future remodelled and relocated stores are set as 
a decreasing percentage of total stores at the beginning of each period minus closed stores until 
2020, when this number is expected to stabilize (Appendix P). 
 
Figure 33. Ulta Historical and Forecasted Operating Results (2013-2022) 
2.1.3 Working Capital 
Please refer to Appendix Q. 
2.1.4 D&A and CAPEX 
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2.2 Cost of capital 
The cost of capital used was 6,61%, which was derived from the components presented in Table 6. 








Tax rate 24,00% 
WACC 6,61% 
The risk-free rate is once again the 10-year U.S. Treasury Bond yield and the MRP was set, equally, 
at 5,50%. For the beta calculation, a cluster analysis was performed to extract the median unlevered 
beta which was then re-levered to the company’s target capital structure (Appendix S). 
Ulta’s cost of debt is 4,02%, which represents the interest rate (LIBOR+1,25%) of its unused 
revolving credit facility expiring in 2022. This was the cost considered since Ulta does not have 
any outstanding borrowings since 2009. The target capital structure was marked at a 100% equity 
to EV based not only on Ulta’s historical zero debt balance sheet but also on the management’s 
intentions of sustaining this capital structure in the future. 
Finally, the tax rate was assumed to be 24%, the expected level for the forecasted period after the 
changes set by the 2017 Tax Act in the U.S. 
2.3 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
To arrive at the enterprise value of Ulta at the end of 2017, the FCFF was computed based on 
projected financial statements exhibited in Appendix U. The terminal growth rate considered for 
2023 onwards was 2%, the U.S. inflation target set by The Fed. 
The main results are summarized in Table 7, where the upside/downside is given relative to the 





Table 7. Ulta’s DCF Valuation 
EV 16.262 
(-) Net Debt (397)  
Equity Value 16.659 
Number Diluted Shares 62 
Fair Share Price (USD) 268,8 
Upside (Downside) 5,5% 
                 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
2.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis of Ulta’s enterprise value is given in Figure 34. A range of 3-p.p. was tested 
on the company’s WACC and terminal value growth rate. 
EV ($Mm) 
WACC 








 1,7% 16.493  15.408  14.538  
2,0% 17.485  16.262  15.290  
2,3% 18.625  17.235  16.141  
Figure 34. Ulta’s DCF Sensitivity Analysis 
2.4 Relative Valuation 
The multiples used to value Ulta were the forward Price to EPS, EV to Operating CF and EV to 
EBIDTA and the peer group used was the same as for the beta computation. The enterprise value 
that results from each multiple is illustrated in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35. Summary of Ulta Relative Valuation 
Since the values yielded by the last two multiples are fairly close, the enterprise value of the firm 
is assumed to be the average of the two, $11.908Mm, and the fair share price $198,56, a 22,1% 
downside relative to the market share price. 
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2.5 Summary 
The results obtained from the different valuation methods are summarized in Figure 36, in 
comparison to the 12-month price target and 52-week trading range (Reuters, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 36. Summary of Ulta’s share price per valuation method and market comparison 
Hereafter, the enterprise value of Ulta is assumed to be $16.262Mm and its fair share price $268,8, 
the result of the DCF model. Although the Relative Valuation yields a distinct result, the 
outstanding performance of Ulta in the last years, despite the wave of store closings that the 
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B)  Valuation of Merged Entity 
1 Value of Control 
If we recall Ulta’s no-debt policy, it is clear that the company does not have an optimal capital 
structure. The benefits of an increase in leverage could easily be achieved by the current 
management team if the debt policy was to be changed, hence the value created by increasing the 
company’s leverage is going to be assessed as the result of a change in control and not as a financial 
synergy. 
To value the effect of this change on enterprise value, an APV method was implemented to compute 
the value of the levered firm and, afterwards, to compare it to the firm’s unlevered value. The 
chosen market debt-to-equity ratio to portray the optimal capital structure of Ulta was the specialty 
retail industry median of 14,4% and the implicit new debt to be issued $2.000Mm. The interest rate 
considered was the same as the company’s current unused revolving credit facility expiring in 
2022, although in reality the rate would be higher due to increased risk. 
The output of the APV valuation with the optimal capital structure is presented in Appendix V and 
yields an enterprise value of $16.635Mm with PVTS around $395Mm and bankruptcy costs of 
$22Mm. The value of control is therefore $373Mm. 
2 Merged Entity Without Synergies 
The value of the merged entity without synergies is $850.833Mm, which is simply the sum of each 
company’s EV. Accounting for the value of control, this value raises to $851.206Mm, as 
represented in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37. EV of Merged Entity ($Mm) 
834.571 851.20616.262 373




3 Merged Entity With Synergies 
After the integration of the target company, Amazon expects the delivery of synergies, as this is 
one of the main reasons firms engage in M&A activities, as discussed in Part I. An overview of the 
different types of synergies this deal is predicted to generate is given below. 
3.1 Revenue Synergy 
Revenue synergies are difficult to quantify and often overlooked in M&A deals, nevertheless, for 
the purpose of this deal, they are going to be conservatively estimated due to the academic literature 
available surrounding the topic of multi-channel retailing and already discussed in Part I. For the 
reasons presented, a 1% revenue synergy is inputted in the model and linked to the target’s annual 
revenues (Table 8). 
Table 8. Revenue Synergy Estimation 
 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Synergy Realization 15% 40% 65% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Revenue Synergy 10,2 31,3 57,4 94,7 100,3 102,3 104,3 106,4 108,5 110,7 
Operating Costs (8,9) (27,3) (50,2) (82,8) (87,7) (89,5) (91,2) (93,1) (94,9) (96,8) 
Net Revenue Synergy 1,3 3,9 7,2 11,9 12,6 12,8 13,1 13,4 13,6 13,9 
Data in millions of USD except otherwise stated 
3.2 Cost Synergies 
Cost Synergies should realize in four main areas: COGS, Fulfilment, Marketing and General & 
Administrative. Technology & Content costs are not expected to have any synergy benefit since 
the majority of these costs relate to the AWS segment. The 1,0% reduction in Ulta’s COGS is 
related to a decrease in shipping costs following the enhancement of cross-channel activities and 
to the purchasing power of Amazon. Fulfilment costs are also expected to decrease as a 
consequence of optimisation of warehousing and transportation activities. This synergy is predicted 
to achieve a 0,1% of Amazon’s Fulfilment expenses. Regarding Marketing expenses, these can be 
eliminated in 2,5% due to the effectiveness of cross-channel communications and promotions, 
however, only in the third year after the acquisition can these expenses be eliminated, otherwise a 
reduction in the inflow of new customers in the original channel might take place. Lastly, the 
centralization of administrative functions and elimination of duplicate corporate facilities and roles 
contribute to a decrease of 4,0% in General & Administrative costs. Both Marketing and General 
& Administrative synergies are linked to the target’s cost structure. Table 9 presents the 
quantification of each synergy. 
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Table 9. Cost Synergies Estimation 
 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Synergy Realization 15% 40% 65% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
COGS 6,7  20,4  37,4  61,8  65,5  66,8  68,1  69,5  70,9  72,3  
Fulfilment 5,1  16,0  30,1  53,8  61,8  72,3  80,8  88,9  97,5  106,7  
General & Administrative  9,0  28,1  52,1  86,0  91,1  92,9  94,7  96,6  98,6  100,5  
Synergy Realization 0% 0% 15% 40% 65% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Marketing 0,0  0,0  1,5  4,4  7,6  11,9  12,2  12,4  12,7  12,9  
Total Cost Synergies 20,8  64,5  121,3  206,1  225,9  243,9  255,8  267,4  279,6  292,4  
Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
3.3 Financial Synergies 
If we recall the sources of financial synergies discussed in Part I, it is clear that neither cash slack 
nor debt capacity can be applied to the proposed deal. The first because both companies have 
enough cash reserves to fund their own projects and the second because, since Ulta is not under an 
optimal capital structure, synergies resulting from increased debt capacity cannot be calculated. 
Regarding tax benefits, both companies are headquartered in the U.S. but in different states, hence 
tax discrepancies, if existent, are probably negligible. Furthermore, the U.S. 2017 Tax Reform 
introduced the possibility of depreciating 100% of assets purchased after September 2017, which, 
despite being a source of synergy, has a minor impact in present value terms as these are already 
risk-free cash-flows. 
3.4 Transaction and Integration Costs 
Transaction costs include one-time advisory and legal fees, estimated to be $60Mm3 and incurred 
in 2018. Integration costs should reach 1% of the target enterprise value, approximately $163Mm, 
and consist mainly of integrating fulfilment operations and IT systems, workforce adjustments and 
knowledge transfer. These costs are distributed in the first three years after the acquisition, before 
the synergies reach their full realization. 
3.5 Valuation output 
The enterprise value of the merged entity accounting for the value of control and synergies is 
$855.329Mm, which translates into a net synergy value of $4.123Mm. Figure 38 illustrates the 
present value (PV) of each synergy type, summing up to $4.333Mm, the PV of integration costs 
and the one-time transaction fee.  
                                                          
3 Average value for similar deals. 
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Figure 38.  Net Synergies Breakdown ($Mm) 
The merged entity WACC assumes a value of 8,26%, which emerges from a target capital structure 
of 5,3% net debt to EV, the median value for the internet and direct marketing retail industry 
combined with the specialty retail industry, and a beta of 1,04 (Appendix W). 
3.6 Distribution of Synergy Benefits 
In the retail and wholesale industries, target shareholders capture on average 23% of total synergies 
created ,while the acquiring firm receives the remaining 77%  (BCG, 2013). Applying these rates 
























Part VI- The Acquisition 
1 Mode of Acquisition 
The proposed deal would ideally be characterized as a friendly takeover instead of hostile. Since 
Ulta has common takeover defences and is subject to provisions of Delaware law, that restrict 
changes in control, engaging in a hostile takeover would be difficult and costly. Therefore, a 
friendly approach to the target firm’s board and the negotiation of the terms of the transaction is 
the preferred mode to proceed. 
2 Bid Price 
The first step in setting the bid price is to add the value of the target to the PV of net synergies and 
the value of control (Table 10). This is the maximum bid price the acquiring firm can offer. 
Table 10. Maximum Bid Price 
EV target 16.262 
(+) Value of control 373 
(+) Net synergies 4.123 
(-) Net debt (397) 
Equity value 21.155 
Max bid price (USD) 341,3 
Implied premium 34,0% 
     Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
Given that the bid price cannot be lower than the current market price of the target, the range of 
possible bid prices is from $254,8 to $341,3. 
The premium of comparable deals in the retail industry ranges from 19% to 80%, with an average 
of 42% (Appendix X). Since the proposed transaction is to be implemented as a friendly takeover, 
setting a low premium is the most sensate decision. 
A premium of 30% is recommended and a corresponding offer of $331,2 per share should be 
carried forward. With this premium level, the acquiring shareholders capture $863,1Mm assuming 
full synergy realization and change of control. 
3 Form of Payment 
Amazon should finance this $20,5Bn deal entirely with cash, following the pattern of previous 
acquisitions and signalling to the market that the company is confident in the success of the deal. 
53 
Furthermore, recalling the fair share price of Amazon calculated in Part IV, the company is 
undervalued in the market, hence paying with stock would be inconsistent with the firm’s interests. 
4 Accretion/Dilution Analysis  
To measure the impact on the acquiring firm’s shareholders earnings, an Accretion/Dilution 
analysis was performed (Appendix Y). The results obtained are favourable to the acceptance of 
this acquisition by the buyer’s shareholders. Indeed, an accretion of 12,4% is expected in the first 
year, remaining positive throughout the complete forecasted period (Table 11). 
Table 11. Accretion/Dilution Analysis 
 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Pro-forma Net Income 
($Mm) 
5.561  9.085  11.777  15.789  19.556  23.984  27.953  31.027  34.344  37.905  
Total Diluted Shares 
($Mm) 
485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  
Pro-forma EPS 11,5  18,7  24,3  32,6  40,4  49,5  57,7  64,0  70,9  78,2  
Accretion (Dilution) 12,4% 8,6% 7,7% 6,6% 5,7% 4,7% 4,1% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 
 
5 Execution Risks 
Any M&A deal carries a certain portion of risk. In cash deals, the urgency of assessing risks, in 
specific the ones associated with synergies, is even higher because acquiring shareholders take on 
the entire risk of the operation. Figure 39 provides the assessment of the major risks involved in 




Figure 39. Risk Assessment Matrix for Amazon-Ulta Deal 
 
Modeling errors
Failure to reach 
agreement for a 
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Underestimation 



















The risks with the highest impact all relate to potential overpayment, which is one of the reasons 
why so many M&A deals fail to create value for acquiring shareholders. For this transaction in 
specific, the appearance of multiple bidders is unlikely because the deal should be carried forward 
as a friendly takeover, which, in itself, discourages counter-bids. Nevertheless, if no agreement is 
reached with the target company and Amazon is forced to carry the transaction as a hostile takeover, 





















This dissertation was intended to analyse a potential target for Amazon as part of the company’s 
strategy to expand its presence in the brick-and-mortar segment of retailing and to recommend the 
bid price at which the offer should be made. 
I started by analysing the retail segment and found that pure e-commerce players are starting to 
expand to physical stores as part of an omnichannel strategy. With the Whole Foods acquisition in 
2017, Amazon is clearly following the same pattern and, after expanding into brick-and-mortar 
grocery stores, I propose an entrance in the profitable U.S. beauty market, by acquiring the 
specialty retailer Ulta. 
I propose a bid price of $331,2 per share, which includes a 30% premium over the market price at 
the 21st May 2018. This recommendation is based on a thoroughly analysis that involved the 
projection of cash flows for Amazon and Ulta independently and as a merged firm. Under my 
projections, the enterprise value of Amazon is $834.571Mm and of Ulta is $16.262Mm. These 
results indicate a 5,1% and 5,5% upside potential relative to current stock prices. The acquisition 
should result in synergies of $4.333Mm decreased by transaction fees of $60Mm and integration 
costs valued in $151Mm. Additionally, I recognize that Ulta is not being managed under optimal 
capital structure and estimate a $373Mm value of control. 
The transaction should be a cash deal carried as a friendly takeover and has the potential of creating 
$863.1Mm for Amazon’s shareholders and an accretion of 12,4% in the first year’s EPS. 
Nevertheless, this transaction carries a certain portion of risk that should not be neglectable, 
including underestimation of time and cost to realize synergies. Limitations to this study include 
the identification of alternative targets which could have involved Sally Beauty, and the 
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Appendix A: List of Amazon’s Subsidiaries 
Subsidiary Description 
6pm Fashion Brands 
Abebooks Books, art and collectibles 
ACX Audiobook Publishing 
Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web 
Amazon Business Purchasing solutions for business supplies 
Amazon Drive Cloud Storage 
Amazon Inspire Digital Educational Resources 
Amazon Music Music Streaming 
Amazon Rapids Children stories 
Amazon Restaurants Food delivery from local restaurnts 
Amazon Video Direct Video Distribution 
Amazon Warehouse Used Products 
Amazon Web Services Scalable Cloud Computing Services 
Amazonfresh Groceries 
Amazonglobal International shipping 
Audible Audio Books 
Audiobookstand Audio books 
Book Depository Books with free delivery worldwide 
Box Office Mojo Movie Box Office Data 
Comixology Digital Comics 
Createspace Publishing 
Dpreview Digital Photography 
East Dane Designer Men's Fashion 
Fabric Sewing, quilting and knitting 
Goodreads Book reviews and recommendations 
Home Services Cleaning, assembly and house improvement 
Imdb Database for movies, TV and entertainment programs 
Imdbpro Entertainment information for professionals 
Junglee.com Online shopping in India 
Kindle Direct Publishing Digital Publishing 
Prime Now Subscription service 
Prime Photos Photo Storage 
Shopbop Designer Fashion Brands 
Souq.com Online shopping in the Middle East 
Subscribe with Amazon Subscription services 
Tenmarks.com Math Activities for Kids and Schools 
Whole Foods Market Healthy Grocery Store 
Withoutabox Film Festivals 
Woot! Discount e-commerce 






Appendix B: Prime Membership Fees per Country in 2017 
 
Prime membership fee 
(local currency) 
Prime membership 
fee (USD)  
U.S.  $                    99,00   $                      99,00  
Germany  €                    95,88   $                    118,37  
U.K.  £                    95,88   $                    136,56  
Japan  ¥               4.800,00   $                      44,72  
Rest of the World   
Canada  $                    79,00   $                      62,81  
France  €                    49,00   $                      60,60  
India  ₹                  999,00   $                      15,26  
Italy  €                    59,88   $                      74,06  
Luxemburg   €                    47,88   $                      59,22  
Netherlands  €                    47,88   $                      59,22  
Singapore  $                    35,88   $                      27,45  
Spain  €                    59,88   $                      74,06  
Average    $                      54,09  
Exchange rates of 14th April 2018 
 
Appendix C: Amazon’s E-commerce Revenue Forecast 
The forecast was divided in U.S. and International net sales. E-commerce net sales in the U.S. were 
forecasted in more detail under the following assumptions: 
• Average spending per year for Prime members was set at $1.000 in 2018 and updated according 
to changes in consumer spending in the U.S. as predicted by Trading Economics, (2018). 
• Percentage of consumers with intention to renew their Prime membership at the end of 2017 
was 95% and assumed to remain stable in the future (CIRP, 2017). 
• Following Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods, Morgan Stanley estimates that 5 million 
Whole Foods customers are not currently subscribed to Prime. Amazon has already started 
attracting these customers by offering in-store discounts to Prime members and it is forecasted 






Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
 
2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Prime Members (% of total customers) 63,0% 64,9% 67,2% 69,2% 71,1% 72,5% 73,6% 
Growth  3,0% 3,5% 3,0% 2,8% 2,0% 1,5% 
U.S. Total Amazon customers 106 123 134 138 139 141 142 
Total number of non-members U.S. 39  43  44  42  40  39  37  
Average spending per year Non-members (USD) 729  750  769  790  812  835  858  
Consumer Spending U.S. Growth 2,8% 2,9% 2,5% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 
U.S. Net Sales Non-members 28.480  32.382  33.894  33.500  32.651  32.225  32.129  
Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
For e-commerce sales outside the U.S., Amazon’s market share was predicted against the forecast for global e-commerce sales growth. 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Global E-commerce sales 2300000 2800000 3300000 3900000 4500000 5193000 5987529 
Growth  21,6% 19,5% 18,7% 15,4% 15,4% 15,3% 
Amazon Market Share 2,0% 2,2% 2,3% 2,5% 2,8% 3,0% 3,3% 
World Net Sales E-commerce (except U.S.) 45.240  61.600  75.900  97.500  126.000  155.790  197.588  
 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
U.S. Net Sales E-commerce ($Mm) 94.995  114.471  128.975  136.621  142.902  148.964  155.136  
Growth 
 
20,5% 12,7% 5,9% 4,6% 4,2% 4,1% 
As a % of total sales 67,7% 65,0% 63,0% 58,4% 53,1% 48,9% 44,0% 
World Net Sales E-commerce (except U.S.) ($Mm) 45.240  61.600  75.900  97.500  126.000  155.790  197.588  
Growth 17,8% 36,2% 23,2% 28,5% 29,2% 23,6% 26,8% 
As a % of total sales 32,3% 35,0% 37,0% 41,6% 46,9% 51,1% 56,0% 
Total Net Sales E-commerce ($Mm) 140.235  176.071  204.875  234.121  268.902  304.754  352.724  
Growth  25,6% 16,4% 14,3% 14,9% 13,3% 15,7% 
 
2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Existing customers  63 76 86 90 94 97 
New customers  16 13 8 8 8 8 
Customers conversion from Whole Foods  1,0 1,5 1,5 0,5 0,0 0,0 
Total number Prime members U.S. 67 80 90 95 99 102 104 
Growth 55,0% 20,0% 13,0% 5,5% 4,0% 3,0% 2,5% 
Average spending per year Prime members (USD) 1.000 1.028 1.054 1.084 1.114 1.145 1.177 
Consumer Spending U.S. Growth 2,8% 2,9% 2,5% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 2,8% 
U.S. Net Sales Prime members 66.515 82.089 95.081 103.121 110.251 116.738 123.007 
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Appendix D: Amazon’s Subscription Services Revenue Forecast 
Subscription Services include Prime membership fees and revenue from books, music, videos and games subscriptions, however, for 
simplicity, only Prime fees are recorded for this segment. Net sales were estimated based on the number of Prime members per country 
as previously defined and the membership fee adjusted for inflation forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (2018) 
 
2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
United States 66,5  79,8  90,2  95,2  99,0  101,9  104,5  
Growth 55,0% 20,0% 13,0% 5,5% 4,0% 3,0% 2,5% 
Germany 7,8  11,0  15,8  23,2  33,9  49,1  70,7  
Growth 39,3% 41,0% 43,0% 47,0% 46,0% 45,0% 44,0% 
United Kingdom 4,6  6,4  9,0  12,8  17,9  24,8  34,3  
Growth 38,5% 40,0% 41,0% 42,0% 40,0% 39,0% 38,0% 
Japan 14,6  18,6  23,7  29,8  36,7  44,4  53,2  
Growth 28,2% 28,0% 27,0% 26,0% 23,0% 21,0% 20,0% 
Rest of the World 10,4  18,8  34,3  59,7  101,4  162,2  243,4  
Growth 78,8% 81,0% 82,0% 74,0% 70,0% 60,0% 50,0% 
Total number Prime members 104 134,7  172,9  220,6  288,8  382,5  506,1  
Growth 50,5% 29,7% 28,4% 27,6% 30,9% 32,5% 32,3% 
 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
  
2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Prime Fee U.S.  99  101  104  106  109  111  114  
CPI yoy Growth U.S. 2,1% 2,1% 2,6% 2,4% 2,2% 2,3% 2,3% 
Prime Fee Germany 118  120  123  125  128  131  134  
CPI yoy Growth Germany 1,6% 1,5% 2,0% 2,1% 2,3% 2,5% 2,5% 
Prime Fee UK  137  140  143  146  149  152  155  
CPI yoy Growth U.K. 2,6% 2,6% 2,2% 2,1% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 
Prime Fee Japan 45 45  45  46  47  48  48  
CPI yoy Growth Japan 0,4% 0,5% 1,1% 1,6% 1,3% 1,6% 1,6% 
Prime Fee Rest of the World  54  56  58  60  62  63  66  
CPI yoy Growth World 3,1% 3,3% 3,3% 3,3% 3,2% 3,2% 3,2% 






 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Net Sales Subscriptions U.S. 6.585  8.068  9.354  10.105  10.740  11.317  11.867  
Net Sales Subscriptions Germany 926  1.326  1.934  2.903  4.335  6.443  9.510  
Net Sales Subscriptions U.K. 622  893  1.286  1.865  2.663  3.776  5.315  
Net Sales Subscriptions Japan 651  837  1.075  1.376  1.714  2.108  2.570  
Net Sales Subscriptions Rest of the World 937  1.052  1.979  3.556  6.239  10.302  15.947  
Net Sales Subscription Services 9.721  12.176  15.628  19.805  25.693  33.946  45.209  
Growth  25,3% 28,3% 26,7% 29,7% 32,1% 33,2% 
 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix E: Amazon’s Physical Stores Revenue Forecast 
Physical Stores revenues includes product sales from Amazon’s 13 physical bookstores and the 472 acquired Whole Foods stores. Only 
the larger portion of this segment is considered for estimation purposes. The number of Whole Foods customers was predicted based on 
research from Morgan Stanley after Amazon’s acquisition of the retail chain. In terms of average prices, one of Amazon’s promises with 
the acquisition was to lower the prices of the chain, which was implemented at the beginning of 2018. It is forecasted that until 2020, 
the company lowers prices even more in an attempt to change customers’ perception of Whole Foods as an overpriced retailer. 
 
2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Number of Whole Foods customers 12,9  17,4  21,7  25,2  27,2  28,1  28,9  
Growth  34,9% 24,7% 16,1% 7,9% 2,9% 2,8% 
Price cuts  -1,9% -2,8% -3,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Net Sales 16.030  21.317  25.988  29.401  31.734  32.654  33.568  
Growth  33,0% 21,9% 13,1% 7,9% 2,9% 2,8% 






Appendix F: AWS Revenue Forecast 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
Total Cloud Market 52.222  66.602  82.636  100.354  121.328  145.351  173.694  
Growth 31,8% 27,5% 24,1% 21,4% 20,9% 19,8% 19,5% 
AWS Market share 33,4% 33,6% 33,7% 33,8% 33,8% 33,7% 33,6% 
AWS Net Sales 17.459  22.378  27.848 33.920 41.009 48.983 58.361 
Growth 42,9% 28,1% 24,48% 21,8% 20,9% 19,4% 19,1% 
 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix G: Amazon’s Working Capital Assumptions 
Working Capital data was divided between the Retail and AWS segments based on net sales and considering that AWS does not hold 
inventory. Unearned revenue for each segment was forecasted based on its 3-year historical average weight on net sales and set as a 
decreasing rate over time. 
Retail  
Inventory Days 50 
Accounts Receivable Days 23 
Accounts Payable Days 97 
AWS  
Accounts Receivable Days 23 
Accounts Payable Days 97 
 
Appendix H: Amazon’s D&A, CAPEX and PP&E acquired under capital and finance leases Forecast 
Depreciation on existing Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) was maintained at the same level of 2017, whereas depreciation for 
new PP&E, either acquired through Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) or capital and finance leases, was depreciated at an 8,4% rate. PP&E 
depreciation also includes amortization of capitalized internal-use software and website development costs, since this asset is recorded 
under PP&E. Amortization of acquired intangible assets and video and music content, recorder under Other Assets in the Corporate 
segment, was modelled similarly to PP&E but using a depreciation rate of 7,7% on new additions. 
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  Relative Weight on PP&E Estimated Useful Life (years) 
Land and Buildings 35,2% 20,5  
Equipment 61,3% 7,5  
Internal Use Software and Website Development 1,4% 2,0  
Other Corporate Assets 2,2% 4,0  
Average PP&E  11,9  
Depreciation Rate PP&E   8,4% 
Other Assets   13,0 
Depreciation Rate Other Assets   7,7% 
 
Net Addition to PP&E per segment was forecasted as a fixed percentage of net sales, according to the historical 3-year average. From 
here, CAPEX was defined as being a constant percentage of Net Addition, since Amazon also relies heavily on capital and finance leases 
to acquire PP&E. Assets acquired under capital and finance leases were computed as being the remaining Net Addition to PP&E that 
was not allocated to CAPEX minus proceeds from incentives received from PP&E vendors. PP&E related to the Corporate segment was 
allocated to the other segments based on usage. Other assets such as acquired intangible assets and video and music content are assumed 
to be part of the Corporate segment and evolve at a decreasing percentage of consolidated net sales. 
Net Addition to PP&E 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Retail 18.700  15.893  18.308  20.602  23.228  25.881  29.353  31.554  33.577  35.593  37.581  
As a % of Retail net sales 11,7% 7,3% 7,1% 6,9% 6,7% 6,5% 6,3% 6,1% 5,9% 5,7% 5,5% 
AWS 9.883  13.265  15.114  16.714  18.156  19.238  20.003  19.067  17.549  15.397  12.543  
As a % of AWS net sales 56,6% 59,3% 54,3% 49,3% 44,3% 39,3% 34,3% 29,3% 24,3% 19,3% 14,3% 
Net Addition to consolidated PP&E 28.583  29.158  33.423  37.316  41.385  45.119  49.356  50.620  51.126  50.990  50.124  
As a % of consolidated net sales 16,1% 12,2% 11,7% 11,3% 10,7% 10,1% 9,5% 8,7% 8,0% 7,3% 6,5% 






PP&E CAPEX 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Retail - 7.086  8.163  9.185  10.356  11.539  13.087  14.068  14.970  15.869  16.755  
Proceeds from PP&E incentives - (1.217)  (1.402)  (1.578)  (1.779)  (1.982)  (2.248)  (2.416)  (2.571)  (2.726)  (2.878)  
CAPEX net of proceeds from 
incentives Retail 
 - 5.869  6.761  7.608  8.578  9.557  10.839  11.652  12.399  13.143  13.878  
AWS - 5.914  6.739  7.452  8.095  8.577  8.918  8.501  7.824  6.865  5.592  
Proceeds from PP&E incentives - (1.016)  (1.157)  (1.280)  (1.390)  (1.473)  (1.532)  (1.460)  (1.344)  (1.179)  (961)  
CAPEX net of proceeds from 
incentives AWS 
 - 4.898  5.581  6.172  6.705  7.104  7.387  7.041  6.480  5.686  4.632  
Consolidated 11.955 13.000 14.901 16.637 18.451 20.116 22.005 22.569 22.795 22.734 22.348 
As a % of Net Addition to PP&E 35,2% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 44,6% 
Proceeds from PP&E incentives (1.897)  (2.233)  (2.559)  (2.857)  (3.169)  (3.455)  (3.779)  (3.876)  (3.915)  (3.905)  (3.838)  
As a % of Net Addition to PP&E 6,6% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 7,7% 
CAPEX net of proceeds from 
incentives Consolidated 
10.058  10.767  12.342  13.780  15.282  16.661  18.226  18.693  18.880  18.829  18.509  
Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
PP&E acquired under leases 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Retail  - 10.024  11.547  12.994  14.651  16.324  18.514  19.902  21.178  22.449  23.703  
AWS - 8.366  9.533  10.542  11.452  12.134  12.616  12.026  11.069  9.712  7.912  
Total 18.525  18.391  21.081  23.536  26.102  28.458  31.130  31.928  32.247  32.161  31.615  
Data in $Mm 
 
Other Assets CAPEX 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Other assets Beginning 4.723  8.897  9.319  10.804  12.242  13.886  15.569  17.730  19.113  20.408  21.705  
+CAPEX 6.821  3.298  4.629  4.891  3.766  3.256  4.207  3.949  4.428  5.046  5.702  
-Amortizations (2.647) (2.875) (3.144) (3.454) (2.121) (1.573) (2.046) (2.566) (3.133) (3.748) (4.414) 
Other assets Ending 8.897  9.319  10.804  12.242  13.886  15.569  17.730  19.113  20.408  21.705  22.993  
As a % of consolidated net sales 5,0% 3,9% 3,8% 3,7% 3,6% 3,5% 3,4% 3,3% 3,2% 3,1% 3,0% 








Appendix I: Amazon’s Debt Schedule and Capital and Finance Lease Repayments 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Long-term Debt Opening 7.694 24.743  24.643  23.309  22.051  21.051  19.801  18.551  17.301  16.051  14.801  
Issuance 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Repayment (1372 (100) (1.334) (1.258) (1.000) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) 
Long-term Debt Closing 24.743 24.643  23.309  22.051  21.051  19.801  18.551  17.301  16.051  14.801  13.551  
Leases Obligations Opening 7.519  13.183  23.005  29.132  33.732  37.908  41.725  45.734  47.934  49.023  49.319  
Assets acquired under leases 13.178  18.391  21.081  23.536  26.102  28.458  31.130  31.928  32.247  32.161  31.615  
Repayment of leases (4.999) (8.569) (14.953) (18.936) (21.926) (24.641) (27.122) (29.727) (31.158) (31.866) (32.058) 
As a % of Opening Lease Obligations 66% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 
Lease Obligations Closing 13.183  23.005  29.132  33.732  37.908  41.725  45.734  47.934  49.023  49.319  48.876  
Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix J: Amazon’s Cluster Analysis and Beta Computation 
The Retail and AWS peer groups defined below exclude small and mid-cap companies (market capitalization below $10Bn) and 
companies with negative ROE or extremely high long-term growth, as these are assumed not to be comparable to Amazon. 
















Amazon Internet & Direct Marketing Retail 692,66 131,3 5,9% 6,32 0,0% 9,6% 20,9% 20,5% 
Ebay Internet Software & Services 40,38 26,0 0,6% -0,95 0,0% 22,4% 7,6% 12,0% 
Alibaba Group Internet Software & Services 440,62 73,6 15,4% 2,55 63,4% 21,9% 21,9% 32,7% 
Best Buy Specialty Retail 20,11 13,0 21,6% 3,33 0,0% 30,8% 22,5% 16,2% 
Walmart Food & Staples Retailing 253,82 204,5 4,4% 3,29 0,0% 12,4% 11,7% 6,9% 
Target Multiline Retail 38,53 39,0 6,9% 5,37 31,9% 22,4% 13,5% 6,2% 
Dollar General Multiline Retail 25,86 12,5 24,1% 5,64 53,4% 21,3% 16,8% 15,4% 
Facebook Internet Software & Services 477,00 84,5 10,1% 5,49 23,4% 27,2% 24,2% 26,1% 
Alphabet Internet Software & Services 717,99 197,3 0,0% 18,27 0,0% 15,4% 23,8% 24,6% 
Booking Internet & Direct Marketing Retail 100,72 25,5 8,9% 47,78 0,0% 35,3% 22,2% 16,0% 
Expedia Group Internet & Direct Marketing Retail 16,28 18,5 22,0% 2,49 48,4% 8,4% 11,9% 15,2% 









Ebay 7,6% 26,0 12,0% 
Expedia Group 11,9% 18,5 15,2% 
Booking 22,2% 25,5 16,0% 
Best Buy 22,5% 13,0 16,2% 
Target 13,5% 39,0 6,2% 
Dollar General 16,8% 12,5 15,4% 
Median 15,2% 21,98 15,3% 
                                       
Retail Cluster 3 ROIC Total Assets ($Bn) Long-Term Growth 
Alibaba Group 21,9% 73,6 32,7% 
Facebook 24,2% 84,5 26,1% 
Median 23,1% 79,08 29,4% 
      
Retail Peer Group Market Debt-to-Equity Effective Tax Rate Beta Unlevered Beta 
Amazon 5,70% 40,94% 1,62 1,57 
Walmart 18,36% 31,79% 0,55 0,49 
Alphabet 0,54% 17,31% 1,06 1,05 
Industry Median Unlevered Beta    1,05 
Retail Levered Beta    1,07 
   
















Amazon Internet & Direct Marketing Retail 692,66 131,31 5,9% 6,32 0,0% 9,6% 20,9% 20,5% 
Alibaba Group Internet Software & Services 440,62 73,63 4,5% 2,55 0,0% 21,9% 21,9% 32,7% 
Alphabet Internet Software & Services 717,99 197,30 0,6% 18,27 0,0% 15,4% 22,9% 24,6% 
Apple Technology Hardware & Storage 886,58 375,32 13,8% 9,27 24,0% 39,0% 65,9% 13,2% 
Akamai Technologies Internet Software & Services 12,15 4,60 5,5% 1,27 0,0% 7,5% 0,7% 15,5% 
Microsoft Corp Software 716,70 250,31 13,2% 2,74 49,2% 34,5% 10,7% 11,1% 
International Business Machines IT Services 144,36 125,36 27,8% 6,17 37,9% 62,7% 17,1% 2,9% 
Oracle Software 188,11 134,99 33,4% 2,27 26,8% 21,4% 9,3% 9,1% 
         
 





Amazon 20,9% 131,3 20,5% 
Walmart 11,7% 204,5 6,9% 
Alphabet 23,8% 197,3 24,6% 
Median 20,9% 197,3 20,5% 
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Amazon 20,9% 131,3 20,5% 
Alibaba Group 21,9% 73,6 32,7% 
Akamai Technologies 0,7% 4,6 15,5% 
International Business Machines 17,1% 125,4 2,9% 
Oracle 9,3% 135,0 9,1% 
Median 17,1% 125,4 15,5% 
   





Alphabet 22,9% 197,3 24,6% 
Apple 65,9% 375,3 13,2% 
Microsoft 10,7% 250,3 11,1% 
Median 22,9% 250,3 13,2% 
 
AWS Peers Market-Debt-to-Equity Effective Tax Rate Beta Unlevered Beta 
Amazon 5,70% 40,90% 1,62 1,57 
Alibaba Group 3,98% 0,23 2,52 2,45 
Akamai Technologies 5,28% 0,23 0,63 0,60 
International Business Machines 35,67% 1,50% 0,90 0,67 
Oracle 30,36% 18,90% 1,15 0,92 
Industry Median Unlevered Beta    0,92 









Appendix K: Amazon’s Consolidated Financial Statements 
Historical Income Statement 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net sales 74.452  88.988  107.006  135.987  177.866  
COGS (54.181) (62.752) (71.651) (88.265) (111.934) 
Fulfillment (8.585) (10.766) (13.410) (17.619) (25.249) 
Technology & content (6.565) (9.275) (12.540) (16.085) (22.620) 
Marketing (3.133) (4.332) (5.254) (7.233) (10.069) 
General & administrative (1.129) (1.552) (1.747) (2.432) (3.674) 
Other (114) (133) (171) (167) (214) 
Operating income 745  178  2.233  4.186  4.106  
Interest income 38  39  50  100  202  
Interest expense (141) (210) (459) (484) (848) 
Other income (expense) (136) (118) (256) 90  346  
Net income before taxes 506  (111) 1.568  3.892  3.806  
Provision for income taxes (161) (167) (950) (1.425) (769) 
Equity method investment activity, net of tax (71) 37  (22) (96) (4) 
Net income 274  (241) 596  2.371  3.033  
                     Data in $Mm    
 
Projected Income Statement 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Net sales 239.071  284.461  331.012  385.922  445.054  521.749  579.491  638.091  700.565  766.897  
COGS (149.301) (175.010) (201.726) (232.126) (265.368) (309.543) (342.049) (376.254) (412.751) (451.549) 
Fulfillment (34.021) (40.032) (46.346) (53.806) (61.787) (72.288) (80.794) (88.873) (97.494) (106.658) 
Technology & content (30.398) (36.122) (42.884) (50.976) (59.918) (70.812) (79.008) (87.383) (96.280) (105.679) 
Marketing (13.133) (15.552) (18.006) (20.904) (24.004) (28.084) (31.388) (34.527) (37.876) (41.436) 
General & administrative (4.182) (4.976) (5.791) (6.751) (7.786) (9.128) (9.272) (10.209) (11.209) (12.270) 
Other (318) (377) (437) (507) (582) (681) (761) (837) (918) (1.005) 
Operating income 7.718  12.392  15.823  20.851  25.609  31.213  36.219  40.008  44.037  48.299  
Interest income 162  224  246  277  335  406  509  618  746  915  
Interest expense (1.601) (2.011) (2.214) (2.355) (2.489) (2.597) (2.714) (2.754) (2.747) (2.707) 
Other income (expense) 32  34  39  44  50  56  64  69  74  79  
Net income before taxes 6.311  10.638  13.894  18.818  23.506  29.078  34.079  37.941  42.110  46.586  
Provision for income taxes (1.325) (2.234) (2.918) (3.952) (4.936) (6.106) (7.157) (7.968) (8.843) (9.783) 
Equity method investment activity, net of tax (38) (40) (46) (52) (60) (67) (76) (82) (87) (93) 
Net income 4.948  8.364  10.930  14.814  18.510  22.905  26.846  29.892  33.179  36.710  
Data in $Mm 
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Historical Balance Sheet 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash and equivalents 8.658  14.557  15.890  19.334  20.522  
Marketable securities 3.789  2.859  3.918  6.647  10.464  
Inventories 7.411  8.299  10.243  11.461  16.047  
Accounts receivable, net and other 4.920  5.802  5.654  8.339  13.164  
Doubtful Debts (153) (190) 0  0  0  
Total Current Assets 24.625  31.327  35.705  45.781  60.197  
Property and Equipment, Net 11.530  17.608  22.480  29.114  48.866  
Goodwill 2.655  3.319  3.759  3.784  13.350  
Other assets 1.930  2.892  3.445  4.723  8.897  
Total Assets 40.159  54.505  64.747  83.402  131.310  
Accounts Payable 15.133  16.459  20.397  25.309  34.616  
Unearned Revenue 1.159  1.823  3.118  4.768  5.097  
Accrued expenses and others 6.688  9.807  10.384  13.739  18.170  
Total Current Liabilities 22.980  28.089  33.887  43.816  57.883  
Long-term debt 3.191  8.265  8.227  7.694  24.743  
Lease Obligations 1.990  4.224  5.948  7.519  13.183  
Construction liabilities 385  467  378  714  1.350  
Tax contingencies 457  510  932  1.395  1.004  
Long-term deferred tax liabilities 571  1.021  1.084  392  990  
Other long-term liabilities 839  1.188  1.584  2.587  4.448  
Total Liabilities 30.413  43.764  51.363  64.117  103.601  
Common stock 5  5  5  5  5  
Treasury stock (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) 
Additional paid-in capital 9.573  11.135  13.394  17.186  21.389  
Retained earnings 2.190  1.949  2.545  4.916  8.636  
Accumulated other comprehensive loss (185) (511) (723) (985) (484) 
Total Equity 9.746  10.741  13.384  19.285  27.709  








Projected Balance Sheet 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Cash and equivalents 32.310  36.497  42.550  53.634  67.206  86.821  107.657  132.126  164.533  205.604  
Marketable securities 10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  10.464  
Inventories 20.711  24.278  27.984  32.201  36.812  42.940  47.450  52.195  57.258  62.640  
Accounts receivable, net and other 14.995  17.842  20.762  24.206  27.915  32.726  36.348  40.023  43.942  48.103  
Doubtful Debts 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Total Current Assets 78.481  89.082  101.760  120.505  142.398  172.951  201.919  234.808  276.196  326.811  
Property and Equipment, Net 66.747  86.088  106.192  126.893  150.169  175.440  199.004  221.815  240.213  253.539  
Goodwill 13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  13.350  
Other assets 9.319  10.804  12.242  13.886  15.569  17.730  19.113  20.408  21.705  22.993  
Total Assets 167.897  199.324  233.543  274.634  321.486  379.471  433.385  490.381  551.464  616.693  
Accounts Payable 44.233  52.005  60.255  69.719  80.111  93.670  103.613  114.101  125.281  137.150  
Unearned Revenue 7.400  8.520  9.584  10.787  11.995  13.541  14.460  15.284  16.080  16.835  
Accrued expenses and others 22.427  25.296  28.335  31.851  35.683  40.694  44.410  48.274  52.393  56.767  
Total Current Liabilities 74.059  85.822  98.174  112.358  127.790  147.904  162.483  177.658  193.753  210.752  
Long-term debt 24.643  23.309  22.051  21.051  19.801  18.551  17.301  16.051  14.801  13.551  
Lease Obligations 23.005  29.132  33.732  37.908  41.725  45.734  47.934  49.023  49.319  48.876  
Construction liabilities 1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  1.350  
Tax contingencies 1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  1.004  
Long-term deferred tax liabilities 1.481  1.762  2.050  2.390  2.756  3.231  3.589  3.952  4.339  4.749  
Other long-term liabilities 4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  4.448  
Total Liabilities 129.989  146.826  162.808  180.509  198.875  222.222  238.109  253.486  269.013  284.731  
Common stock 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  
Treasury stock (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) (1.837) 
Additional paid-in capital 26.640  32.866  40.173  48.750  58.726  70.458  83.384  97.652  113.347  130.554  
Retained earnings 13.584  21.948  32.878  47.691  66.202  89.107  114.208  141.559  171.420  203.725  
Accumulated other comprehensive loss (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) (484) 
Total Equity 37.907  52.498  70.735  94.125  122.612  157.249  195.276  236.895  282.451  331.963  








Historical Cash Flow Statement 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash flow-operating activities      
Net income 274  (241) 596  2.371  3.033  
D&A 3.253  4.746  6.281  8.116  11.478  
Deferred taxes (156) (316) 81  (246) (29) 
Stock-based compensation 1.134  1.497  2.119  2.975  4.215  
Other operating expense, net 114  129  155  160  202  
Other expense (income), net 89  53  250  (20) (292) 
Non-cash expenses 4.434  6.109  8.886  10.985  15.574  
Accounts receivable (846) (1.039) (1.755) (3.367) (4.786) 
Inventories (1.410) (1.193) (2.187) (1.426) (3.583) 
Accounts payable 1.888  1.759  4.294  5.030  7.175  
Accrued expenses 736  706  913  1.724  283  
Unearned revenue 399  741  1.292  1.955  738  
Changes in working capital 767  974  2.557  3.916  (173) 
Cash from operating activities 5.475  6.842  12.039  17.272  18.434  
Cash flow-investing activities      
Capital expenditures (3.444) (4.893) (5.387) (7.804) (11.955) 
Proceeds from PP&E incentives - - 798  1.067  1.897  
PP&E acquired under capital and finance 
leases 
(10.546) (4.801) (5.232) (6.259) (18.525) 
Acquisitions, net of cash acquired, and other (312) (979) (795) (116) (13.972) 
Sales and maturities of marketable securities 2.306  3.349  3.025  4.733  9.988  
Purchases of marketable securities (2.826) (2.542) (4.091) (7.756) (13.777) 
Cash from investing activities (14.822) (9.866) (11.682) (16.135) (46.344) 
Cash flow-financing activities      
Excess tax benefits from stock-based 
compensation 
78  6  0  0  0  
Dividends paid 0  0  0  0  0  
Proceeds from long-term debt 394  6.359  353  621  16.231  
Repayments of long-term debt (231) (513) (1.652) (354) (1.372) 
Proceeds from leasing 10.546  4.801  5.232  6.259  18.525  
Principal repayments of capital and finance 
lease obligations 
(780) (1.420) (2.583) (4.007) (4.999) 
Cash from financing activities (539) 4.432  (3.882) (3.740) 9.860  
Net change in cash 574  5.899  1.333  3.444  1.188  
Cash and equivalents, beginning of period 8.084  8.658  14.557  15.890  19.334  
Cash and equivalents, end of Period 8.658  14.557  15.890  19.334  20.522  
           Data in $Mm 
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Projected Cash Flow Statement 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Cash flow-operating activities             
Net income 4.948  8.364  10.930  14.814  18.510  22.905  26.846  29.892  33.179  36.710  
D&A 14.153  17.226  20.666  22.805  23.416  26.132  29.622  31.448  36.341  41.212  
Deferred taxes 491  281  288  340  366  475  358  363  387  411  
Stock-based compensation 5.251  6.226  7.307  8.577  9.976  11.732  12.926  14.268  15.695  17.207  
Other operating expense, net - - - - - - - - - - 
Other expense (income), net - - - - - - - - - - 
Non-cash expenses 19.894  23.733  28.261  31.722  33.758  38.339  42.906  46.078  52.423  58.830  
Accounts receivable (1.831) (2.847) (2.920) (3.444) (3.709) (4.811) (3.622) (3.676) (3.919) (4.161) 
Inventories (4.664) (3.566) (3.706) (4.217) (4.611) (6.128) (4.509) (4.745) (5.063) (5.382) 
Accounts payable 9.617  7.772  8.249  9.465  10.392  13.558  9.944  10.487  11.180  11.869  
Accrued expenses 4.257  2.870  3.039  3.516  3.832  5.010  3.717  3.863  4.119  4.375  
Unearned revenue 2.303  1.120  1.063  1.204  1.208  1.545  919  824  796  756  
Changes in working capital 9.681  5.349  5.726  6.523  7.112  9.175  6.448  6.754  7.113  7.457  
Cash from operating activities 34.522  37.446  44.917  53.058  59.380  70.420  76.200  82.724  92.715  102.996  
Cash flow-investing activities             
Capital expenditures (13.000) (14.901) (16.637) (18.451) (20.116) (22.005) (22.569) (22.795) (22.734) (22.348) 
Proceeds from PP&E incentives 2.233  2.559  2.857  3.169  3.455  3.779  3.876  3.915  3.905  3.838  
PP&E acquired under capital and finance 
leases 
(18.391) (21.081) (23.536) (26.102) (28.458) (31.130) (31.928) (32.247) (32.161) (31.615) 
Increases in other assets (3.298) (4.629) (4.891) (3.766) (3.256) (4.207) (3.949) (4.428) (5.046) (5.702) 
Acquisitions, net of cash acquired, and other - - - - - - - - - - 
Sales and maturities of marketable securities - - - - - - - - - - 
Purchases of marketable securities - - - - - - - - - - 
Cash from investing activities (32.456) (38.052) (42.207) (45.150) (48.375) (53.564) (54.569) (55.554) (56.036) (55.826) 
Cash flow-financing activities             
Excess tax benefits from stock-based 
compensation 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Dividends paid 0  0  0  0  0  0  (1.745) (2.541) (3.318) (4.405) 
Proceeds from long-term debt 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Repayments of long-term debt (100) (1.334) (1.258) (1.000) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) (1.250) 
Proceeds from leasing 18.391  21.081  23.536  26.102  28.458  31.130  31.928  32.247  32.161  31.615  
Principal repayments of lease obligations (8.569) (14.953) (18.936) (21.926) (24.641) (27.122) (29.727) (31.158) (31.866) (32.058) 
Cash from financing activities 9.722  4.793  3.342  3.176  2.567  2.758  (795) (2.701) (4.272) (6.098) 
Net change in cash 11.788  4.188  6.052  11.084  13.573  19.614  20.836  24.469  32.407  41.072  
Cash and equivalents, beginning of period 20.522  32.310  36.497  42.550  53.634  67.206  86.821  107.657  132.126  164.533  
Cash and equivalents, end of period 32.310  36.497  42.550  53.634  67.206  86.821  107.657  132.126  164.533  205.604  
Data in $Mm
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Appendix L: Amazon’s DCF Valuation 
  Revenue Mix Real GDP Growth Rate Inflation 
U.S. 41,97% 1,40% 2,30% 
Rest of the World 58,03% 3,70% 3,20% 
Weighted Average  2,73% 2,82% 
TV Growth Scenario 1 5,56%   
Note. Retrieved from International Monetary Fund, 2018. 
    
TV Growth Scenario 2 4,50%   
 
 
Retail 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 
EBIT 6.484  9.989  12.456  16.530  20.170  24.525  27.775  30.553  33.517  36.667  - 
*(1-t) 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% - 
NOPLAT 5.123  7.891  9.840  13.059  15.934  19.374  21.943  24.137  26.478  28.967  30.577  
+D&A 5.640  7.176  8.905  10.853  13.025  15.487  16.858  16.645  19.631  22.784  - 
-CAPEX (7.086) (8.163) (9.185) (10.356) (11.539) (13.087) (14.068) (14.970) (15.869) (16.755) - 
-PP&E acquired under leases (10.024) (11.547) (12.994) (14.651) (16.324) (18.514) (19.902) (21.178) (22.449) (23.703) - 
+Change WC 4.464  1.748  1.778  1.911  2.057  2.753  1.750  1.846  1.898  1.940  2.048  
FCFF (1.883) (2.894) (1.657) 816  3.153  6.014  6.581  6.479  9.688  13.233  32.625  
TV (Scenario 1)           1.213.503  
TV (Scenario 2)           862.313 
EV Retail (Scenario 1) 568.360           
EV Retail (Scenario 2) 409.344           









AWS 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 
EBIT 5.416  7.380  9.158  11.072  13.225  15.816  17.716  19.664  21.729  23.902  - 
*(1-t) 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% - 
NOPLAT 4.278  5.830  7.235  8.747  10.448  12.495  13.995  15.535  17.166  18.883  19.932  
+D&A 5.637  6.905  8.307  9.830  8.818  8.598  10.198  11.670  12.962  14.014  - 
-CAPEX (5.914) (6.739) (7.452) (8.095) (8.577) (8.918) (8.501) (7.824) (6.865) (5.592) - 
-PP&E acquired under leases (8.366) (9.533) (10.542) (11.452) (12.134) (12.616) (12.026) (11.069) (9.712) (7.912) - 
+Change WC 960  731  909  1.096  1.222  1.412  982  1.045  1.096  1.142  1.205  
FCFF (3.405) (2.806) (1.542) 127  (222) 970  4.648  9.357  14.648  20.535  21.137  
TV (Scenario 1)           1.033.684  
TV (Scenario 2)           674.606 
EV AWS (Scenario 1) 515.984           
EV AWS (Scenario 2) 343.404           
Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Corporate 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 
EBIT (4.182) (4.976) (5.791) (6.751) (7.786) (9.128) (9.272) (10.209) (11.209) (12.270) - 
*(1-t) 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% 79% - 
NOPLAT (3.304) (3.931) (4.575) (5.334) (6.151) (7.211) (7.325) (8.065) (8.855) (9.694) (10.232) 
+D&A 2.875  3.144  3.454  2.121  1.573  2.046  2.566  3.133  3.748  4.414  - 
-CAPEX (3.298) (4.629) (4.891) (3.766) (3.256) (4.207) (3.949) (4.428) (5.046) (5.702) - 
+Change WC 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
FCFF (3.727) (5.416) (6.012) (6.978) (7.833) (9.372) (8.707) (9.360) (10.153) (10.982) (10.232) 
TV (Scenario 1)           (429.529) 
TV (Scenario 2)           (293.456) 
EV Corporate (Scenario 1) (249.773)           
EV Corporate (Scenario 2) (186.196)           









Appendix M: Amazon’s Relative Valuation 
Retail Forward EV / Revenue Forward EV / EBITDA 
Forward EV / Operating 
CF 
Amazon 2,88 24,50 24,27 
Alphabet 4,28 11,46 13,97 
Walmart 0,58 9,08 11,22 
Median 2,88 11,46 13,97 
Min 0,58 9,08 11,22 
Max 4,28 24,50 24,27 
EV Retail ($Mm) 624.074 138.951 254.798 
 
AWS Forward EV / Revenue Forward EV / EBITDA 
Forward EV / Operating 
CF 
Amazon 2,88 24,50 24,27 
Alibaba 7,60 21,73 20,80 
Akamai 4,39 11,23 12,42 
International Business Machines 2,08 8,79 9,94 
Oracle 4,31 8,98 11,74 
Median 4,31 11,23 12,42 
Min 2,08 8,79 9,94 
Max 7,60 24,50 24,27 
EV AWS ($Mm) 96.450 124.118 156.343 
  
To value the consolidated firm, the chosen multiple for the Retail segment was the median EV to 
Revenue, because the EV from each multiple is very different and thus, making an average would 
distort results. For AWS, the multiple considered was the average between the median EV to 
EBITDA and EV to Operating CF. 
Retail EV 624.074 
AWS EV 140.231 
Corporate Costs TV (101.184) 
Total EV 663.121 
(-) Net Debt 13.061 
Equity Value 650.060 
Number Diluted Shares 493 
Fair Share Price (USD) 1.319 
Upside (Downside) -16,8% 
                 Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix N: Ulta’s Revenue Forecast 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
Comparable sales growth 11,0% 8,0% 5,8% 4,6% 1,4% 1,4% 
Total comparable sales 5.390,7  6.446,2  7.429,7  8.422,4  9.200,3  9.793,5  
Non-comparable growth 10,2% 9,3% 5,9% 4,3% 1,0% 1,0% 
Total sales non-comparable 513,6  373,7  388,2  412,8  270,0  234,8  
Net sales 5.904,3  6.819,9  7.817,9  8.835,2  9.470,3  10.028,3  
   Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
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Appendix O: Ulta’s New, Remodelled and Relocated Stores Forecast 
 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
New stores 102 100 100 100 70 60 
Remodelled stores 11 12 11 10 11 12 
As a % net stores beginning period 1,1% 1,0% 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 0,8% 
Relocated stores 7 6 5 4 5 5 
As a % net stores beginning period 0,7% 0,5% 0,4% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 
Note. Net stores at the beginning period is calculated as stores at beginning of the period minus closed stores during the period.   
 
Appendix P: Ulta’s Working Capital Assumptions 
Accounts Receivable Days 6,3  
Inventory Days 108,7  
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Asset (% of Operating Expenses) 2,1% 
Accounts Payable Days 30,0  
Accrued Liabilities (% of Operating Expenses) 5,9% 
Accrued Income Taxes (% of Revenues) 0,2% 
 
Appendix Q: Ulta’s CAPEX and D&A 
D&A on existing PP&E was maintained at the same level of 2017, while new PP&E was 
depreciated at a 14,0% rate, according to an average expected useful life of 7,1 years. The company 
does not differentiate between depreciation and amortization, therefore it was assumed that 
amortization is neglectable. 
 Relative Weight on PP&E Estimated Useful Life (years) 
Equipment and Fixtures 40,2% 6,5 
Electronic Equipment and Software 24,6% 4,0 
Leasehold Improvements 35,2% 10,0 
Average  7,1 
Depreciation Rate  14,0% 
 
Each component of the company’s CAPEX was forecasted according to the evolution of its main 







 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
New, Remodelled & Relocated Stores 190,0  175,0  169,8  159,8  104,8  89,9  
Average Capex per new stores 1,9  1,8  1,7  1,6  1,5  1,5  
Merchandising & Refreshed Stores 87,0  80,0  76,3  68,5  57,5  59,8  
Average capex per store at end of period 0,08 0,07 0,06  0,05  0,04  0,04  
Information Systems 74,0  65,0  74,5  75,4  71,0  74,9  
As a % of net sales 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 0,9% 0,8% 0,8% 
Supply Chain 42,0  30,0  34,4  38,9  41,5  43,8  
As a % of net sales 0,7% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 
Store Maintenance and Other 48,0  25,0  28,7  32,4  34,6  36,5  
As a % of net sales 0,8% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 0,4% 
Total CAPEX 441,0  375,0  383,7  374,9  309,5  304,9  
As a % of sales 7,5% 5,5% 4,9% 4,2% 3,3% 3,1% 
    Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix R: Ulta’s Cluster Analysis and Beta Computation 
The peer group presented below already excludes companies with market capitalization above $85Bn or negative ROE, since those are 






















Ulta Beauty Specialty Retail 13,4 2,9 0,0% 9,64 0,0% 35,7% 30,0% 20,0% 
Nordstrom Multiline Retail 8,0 8,1 27,9% 2,87 51,5% 52,0% 13,8% 8,1% 
Target Multiline Retail 38,5 39,0 24,5% 4,65 53,4% 22,4% 11,2% 6,2% 
CVS Health 
Food & Staples 
Retailing 
64,4 95,1 75,4% 5,01 39,4% 17,8% 7,9% 6,8% 
TJX Companies Specialty Retail 51,0 14,1 4,8% 3,96 31,5% 52,2% 34,9% 10,0% 
Estee Lauder Companies Personal Products 54,7 11,6 7,2% 3,40 36,4% 33,5% 20,8% 15,0% 
Urban Outfitters Specialty Retail 4,2 2,0 0,0% 1,55 0,0% 13,2% 13,3% 15,5% 
American Eagle 
Outfitters 
Specialty Retail 3,9 1,8 0,0% 1,08 47,3% 15,7% 17,4% 5,6% 
Kohls Multiline Retail 10,3 13,3 32,6% 4,33 51,9% 13,6% 7,3% 8,8% 
Abercrombie & Fitch Specialty Retail 1,9 2,3 18,2% 0,39 201,5% 2,2% 3,7% 12,6% 
E.l.f. Beauty Personal Products 0,9 0,4 14,9% 0,48 0,0% 13,1% 9,5% 15,0% 
Costco Wholesale 
Food & Staples 
Retailing 
82,9 36,3 7,6% 6,11 136,7% 23,9% 16,4% 11,7% 
Church & Dwight Household Products 11,9 6,0 17,0% 1,88 39,3% 22,4% 15,3% 10,4% 
 
 
         
Cluster 1 ROIC Total Assets ($Bn) Long-Term Growth 
Ulta Beauty 30,0% 2,9 20,0% 
Urban Outfitters 13,3% 2,0 15,5% 
American Eagle Outfitters 17,4% 1,8 5,6% 
Abercrombie & Fitch 3,7% 2,3 12,6% 
E.l.f. Beauty 9,5% 0,4 15,0% 
Church & Dwight 15,3% 6,0 10,4% 
Median 14,3% 2,1 13,8% 
 
Cluster 2 ROIC Total Assets ($Bn) Long-Term Growth 
Nordstrom 13,8% 8,1 8,1% 
TJX Companies 34,9% 14,1 10,0% 
Estee Lauder Companies 20,8% 11,6 15,0% 
Kohls Corp 7,3% 13,3 8,8% 
Median 17,3% 12,5 9,4% 
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Cluster 3 ROIC Total Assets ($Bn) Long-Term Growth 
Target 11,2% 39,0 6,2% 
CVS Health 7,9% 95,1 6,8% 
Costco Wholesale 16,4% 36,3 11,7% 





Effective Tax Rate Beta Unlevered Beta 
Ulta Beauty 0,00% 24,57% 0,67 0,67 
Urban Outfitters 0,00% 33,82% 0,52 0,52 
American Eagle Outfitters 0,00% 33,12% 1,00 1,00 
Abercrombie & Fitch 14,15% 44,84% 0,86 0,80 
E.l.f. Beauty 16,32% 2,64% 0,82 0,71 
Church & Dwight 20,33% 32,08% 0,39 0,34 
Industry Median Unlevered Beta    0,69 
Ulta Levered Beta    0,69 
Note. Although named “Ulta Levered Beta”, Ulta’s beta is actually unlevered because the company does not have debt 
 
Appendix S: Ulta’s Financial Statements  
Income statement 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
Net sales 2.670,6  3.241,4  3.924,1  4.854,7  5.884,5  6.819,9  7.817,9  8.835,2  9.470,3 10.028,3 
COGS (1.729,3) (2.104,6) (2.539,8) (3.107,5) (3.787,7) (4.439,8) (5.089,4) (5.760,5) (6.184,1) (6.548,5) 
SG&A (596,4) (712,0) (863,4) (1.073,8) (1.287,2) (1.500,3) (1.759,0) (2.005,6) (2.149,8) (2.276,4) 
Pre-opening expenses (17,3) (14,4) (14,7) (18,6) (24,3) (26,6)  (31,3)  (34,4) (36,9) (39,1) 
Operating income 327,6  410,4  506,3  654,8  785,3  856,0  945,9  1.046,0  1.119,0 1.187,8 
Interest income 0,1  0,9  1,1  0,9  1,6  1,0  1,1  1,0  1,3 2,4 
Interest expense 0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0 0,0 
Net income before taxes 327,7  411,3  507,4  655,7  786,9  857,0  947,0  1.047,0  1.120,4 1.190,2 
Provision for income taxes (124,9) (154,2) (187,4) (246,0) (231,6) (205,7) (227,3) (251,3) (268,9) (285,7) 
Net income 202,8  257,1  320,0  409,8  555,2  651,3  719,7  795,7  851,5 904,6 






Balance sheet 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
Cash and equivalents 419,5  389,1  345,8  385,0  277,4  299,7  262,3  394,5  803,9  1.446,6 
Short-term investments 0,0 150,2  130,0  30,0  120,0  120,0  120,0  120,0  120,0  120,0  
Accounts receivable, net 47,049  52,4  65,0  88,6  99,7  117,7  134,9  152,5  163,4  173,0  
Inventory, net 457,9  581,2  761,8  944,0  1.096,4  1.321,8  1.515,3  1.715,1  1.841,2  1.949,7 
Prepaid expenses and other current asset 56,0  66,5  72,5  88,6  98,7  122,6  141,3  160,1  171,7 181,8  
Deferred income taxes 22,2  20,8  0,0  0,0  1,5  1,5  1,5  1,5  1,5  1,5  
Total current assets 1.002,7  1.260,4  1.375,2  1.536,2  1.693,7  1.983,3  2.175,3  2.543,7  3.101,7  3.872,6 
Property and equipment, net 595,7  717,2  847,6  1.004,4  1.189,5  1.259,1  1.283,4  1.246,4  1.100,9 982,6  
Other long-term assets 4,3  5,7  8,1  11,3  25,5  25,2  27,6  30,0  31,6  32,9 
Total assets 1.602,7  1.983,2  2.230,9  2.551,9  2.908,7  3.267,5  3.486,3  3.820,1  4.234,2 4.888,2  
Accounts payable 148,3  190,8  196,2  259,5  325,8  365,2  418,6  473,8  508,7  538,6  
Accrued liabilities 103,2  149,4  187,4  260,9  302,3  350,3  403,6  457,5  490,5  519,3  
Accrued income taxes 15,3  19,4  12,7  9,0  14,1  17,0  19,5  22,0  23,6  25,0  
Total current liabilities 266,8  359,6  396,2  529,3  642,2  732,5  841,8  953,4  1.022,8  1.082,9  
Long-term debt 0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  
Deferred rent 261,6  294,1  321,8  366,2  407,9  493,6  565,8  639,4  685,4  725,8  
Deferred income taxes 66,7  74,5  59,5  86,5  59,4  63,5  70,1  77,5  83,0  88,1  
Other long-term liabilities 4,5  7,4  10,5  19,6  25,0  24,9  28,6  32,3  34,6  36,6  
Total liabilities 599,6  735,7  788,0  1.001,7  1.134,5  1.314,5  1.506,3  1.702,6  1.825,8  1.933,5  
Common stock 0,65  0,65  0,64  0,63  0,61  0,594  0,564  0,535  0,511  0,495  
Treasury stock-common, at cost (8,1) (9,7) (11,7) (14,5) (18,8) (18,8) (18,8) (18,8) (18,8) (18,8) 
Additional paid-in capital 548,2  577,0  621,7  658,3  698,9  726,4  758,7  795,5  834,9 876,7  
Retained earnings 462,4  679,6  832,2  905,8  1.093,5  1.244,8  1.239,5  1.340,2  1.591,7 2.096,3  
Total equity 1.003,1  1.247,5  1.442,9  1.550,2  1.774,2  1.953,0  1.980,0  2.117,5  2.408,4  2.954,7  








Cash flow statement 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
Cash flow-operating activities                 
Net income 202,8  257,1  320,0  409,8  555,2  651,3  719,7  795,7  851,5  904,6 
D&A 106,3  131,8  165,0  210,3  252,7  305,4  359,3  412,0  455,5 424,4  
Deferred income taxes 3,9  9,2  5,8  27,0  (27,1) 4,1  6,7  7,4  5,4  5,2  
Stock-based compensation charges 16,0  14,9  15,6  19,3  24,4  27,5  32,3  36,8  39,4 41,8  
Excess tax benefits from stock-based 
compensation 
(13,4) (3,2) (9,5) (9,1) 0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  
Loss on disposal of PP&E 3,9  4,5  3,7  9,1  7,5  - - - - - 
Deferred rent 53,6  32,5  27,7  44,4  41,7  85,7  72,2  73,6  46  40,4 
Other long-term assets 0,2  1,6  0,6  6,0  (8,3) 0,3  (2,4) (2,5) (1,5) (1,4) 
Other long-term liabilities - - - - - (0,1) 3,6  3,7  2,3  2,0  
Non-cash expenses 170,5  191,3  208,9  307,1  290,9  422,9  471,7  531,0  547,1 512,4  
Receivables (5,5) (5,4) (12,6) (23,6) (11,1) (18,0) (17,2) (17,6) (11,0) (9,6) 
Inventory (96,8) (123,3) (180,6) (182,2) (152,4) (225,4) (193,4) (199,8) (126,1) (108,5) 
Accrued income taxes 18,7  7,3  2,8  5,3  3,6  2,9  2,5  2,5  1,6  1,4  
Prepaid expenses and other current asset (5,5) (10,6) (6,0) (16,1) (10,0) (23,9) (18,7) (18,9) (11,6) (10,1) 
Accounts payable 29,4  42,5  5,4  63,3  66,2  39,4  53,4  55,2  34,8  30,0 
Accrued liabilities 14,2  37,6  37,9  71,1  36,9  48,0  53,3  53,9  33,0  28,7  
Changes in working capital (45,6) (51,8) (153,0) (82,2) (66,8) (177,0) (120,1) (124,6) (79,2) (68,1) 
Cash from operating activities 327,7  396,6  375,9  634,7  779,4  897,2  1.071,4  1.202,1  1.319,4  1.348,9  
Cash flow-investing activities                 
CAPEX (226,0) (249,1) (299,2) (373,7) (440,7) (375,0) (383,7) (374,9) (310,1) (306,1) 
Purchases of short-term investments  (200,2) (130,0) (90,0) (330,0) - - - - - 
Proceeds from short-term investments  50,0  150,2  190,0  240,0  - - - - - 
Cash from investing activities (226,0) (399,3) (279,0) (273,7) (530,7) (375,0) (383,7) (374,9) (310,1) (306,1) 
Cash flow-financing activities                 
Debt issuance costs 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 (0,6) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Excess tax benefits from stock-based 
compensation 
13,4  3,2  9,5  9,1  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  
Change in common stock - - - - - (0,02) (0,03) (0,03) (0,02) (0,02) 
Repurchase of common shares (37,3) (39,9) (167,4) (344,3) (367,6) (500,0) (725,0) (695,0) (600,0) (400,0) 
Stock options exercised 21,9  10,6  19,6  16,3  16,2  - - - - - 
Purchase of treasury shares (0,6) (1,6) (2,0) (2,8) (4,2) 0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0  
Cash from financing activities (2,7) (27,6) (140,2) (321,8) (356,2) (500,0) (725,0) (695,0) (600,0) (400,0) 
Net change in cash 99,0  (30,3) (43,3) 39,2  (107,6) 22,2  (37,3) 132,2  409,3  642,8 
Cash and equivalents, beginning of period 320,5  419,5  389,1  345,8  385,0  277,4  299,7  254,1  394,5  803,9  
Cash and equivalents, end of period 419,5  389,1  345,8  385,0  277,4  299,7  262,3  394,5  803,9 1.446,6  
Data in $Mm 
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Appendix T: Ulta’s DCF Valuation 
 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 
EBIT 856,0  945,9  1.046,0  1.114,7  1.178,6  - 
*(1-t) 0,8  0,8  0,8  0,8  0,8  - 
NOPLAT 650,6  718,9  794,9  847,2  895,7  913,6  
+D&A 305,4  359,3  412,0  455,4  424,2  - 
-CAPEX (375,0) (383,7) (374,9) (309,5) (304,9) - 
+Change WC (177,0) (120,1) (124,6) (74,8) (63,1) (64,4) 
FCFF 403,9  574,5  707,4  918,3  951,9  849,3  
Terminal value      18.448,2  
EV 16.262,0      
    Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix U: Ulta’s Relative Valuation 
 Forward EV / EBITDA Forward EV / Operating CF Forward Price / EPS 
Ulta Beauty 12,24 16,63 22,26 
Urban Outfitters 8,22 9,97 16,58 
American Eagle Outfitters 6,08 7,40 13,66 
Abercrombie & Fitch 4,92 6,34 28,58 
E.l.f. Beauty 15,02 16,94 31,07 
Church & Dwight 14,25 19,54 20,25 
Median 10,23 13,30 21,26 
Min 4,92 6,34 13,66 
Max 15,02 19,54 31,07 
EV ($Mm) 11.883 11.934 13.756 
Share Price (USD) 198,15 198,97 228,37  
Upside (Downside) -22,2% -21,9% -10,4% 
  
Appendix V: Ulta’s APV Valuation 
 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 
Bank Debt 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Interest on Bank Debt 80 80 80 80 80 
Interest Tax Shield 19 19 19 19 19 
PV Tax Shield 19 18 17 16 16 
Note. Tax Shields were discounted with Ulta’s cost of debt
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Tax rate 24,0% 
Unlevered beta 0,69 
Unlevered cost of capital 6,6% 
Cost of debt 4,0% 
TV growth rate 2,0% 
 
PV Unlevered Firm  2.869 
PV TV Unlevered Firm  13.393 
PVTS 86 
PV TV Tax Shields 309 
(-) PV Bankruptcy Cost 22 
EV 16.635 
(-) Net Debt (397) 
Equity Value 17.033 
Share Price (USD) 274,8 
                               Data in $Mm except otherwise stated 
 
Appendix W: Merged entity WACC computation 
Rf 2,83% 
Beta 1,04  
Market Risk Premium 5,50% 
Re 8,56% 
Rd 3,73% 
Net Debt to EV 5,31% 
Equity to EV 94,69% 




Appendix X: Comparable Deals 
Date Acquirer Target Deal Value ($bn) Premium Paid 
2017 Amazon Wholefoods 13,7 27% 
2017 Petsmart Chewy.com 3,4 39% 
2017 QVC Home shopping network 2,1 29% 
2017 Harland Clarke Retailmenot 0,6 50% 
2016 Walmart Jet.com 3,0 80% 
2016 Fnac Darty 1,6 47% 
2015 Walgreens Boots Alliance Rite Aid 17,2 48% 
2013 Kroger Harris Teeter 2,7 34% 
2011 Walmart Massmart 2,4 19% 
 
Interest coverage ratio 10,62 
Moody's  Aaa 
S&P AAA 
Probability of Default 0,54% 
Direct bankruptcy cost 20,0% 
Indirect bankruptcy cost 5,0% 
Unlevered Beta Retail 1,09 
EV Retail 568.360  
Unlevered Beta AWS 0,92 
EV AWS 515.984  
Unlevered Beta Amazon 1,01  
EV Amazon 834.571  
Unlevered Beta Ulta 0,69  
EV Ulta 16.262 
Unlevered Beta Merged Entity 1,00  
Market Debt-to-Equity 5,30% 
Tax Rate 21,00% 
Re-levered beta 1,04  
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Appendix Y: Accretion/Dilution Model 
 
2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 
Target Revenue 6.820  7.818  8.835  9.470  10.028  10.229  10.433  10.642  10.855  11.072  
Acquirer Revenue 239.071  284.461  331.012  385.922  445.054  521.749  579.491  638.091  700.565  766.897  
Revenue Synergies 10  31  57  95  100  102  104  106  109  111  
Target COGS (4.440) (5.089) (5.761) (6.184) (6.549) (6.679) (6.813) (6.949) (7.088) (7.230) 
Acquirer COGS (149.301) (175.010) (201.726) (232.126) (265.368) (309.543) (342.049) (376.254) (412.751) (451.549) 
COGS Synergies 7  20  37  62  65  67  68  69  71  72  
Costs Associated with Revenue Synergy (9) (27) (50) (83) (88) (89) (91) (93) (95) (97) 
Acquirer Fulfilment Costs (34.021) (40.032) (46.346) (53.806) (61.787) (72.288) (80.794) (88.873) (97.494) (106.658) 
Fulfilment Synergies 5  16  30  54  62  72  81  89  97  107  
Acquirer Technology & Content Costs (30.398) (36.122) (42.884) (50.976) (59.918) (70.812) (79.008) (87.383) (96.280) (105.679) 
Target Marketing Costs (308) (361) (412) (442) (468) (477) (487) (496) (506) (516) 
Acquirer Marketing Costs (13.133) (15.552) (18.006) (20.904) (24.004) (28.084) (31.388) (34.527) (37.876) (41.436) 
Marketing Synergies 0  0  2  4  8  12  12  12  13  13  
Target General & Administrative Costs (1.192) (1.398) (1.594) (1.708) (1.809) (1.845) (1.882) (1.919) (1.958) (1.997) 
Acquirer General & Administrative Costs (4.182) (4.976) (5.791) (6.751) (7.786) (9.128) (9.272) (10.209) (11.209) (12.270) 
General & Administrative Synergies 9  28  52  86  91  93  95  97  99  101  
Target Other Costs (24) (23) (23) (17) (16) (16) (16) (17) (17) (17) 
Acquirer Other Costs (318) (377) (437) (507) (582) (681) (761) (837) (918) (1.005) 
Operating income 8.596  13.406  16.997  22.188  27.036  32.681  37.724  41.549  45.616  49.917  
Target Interest Income 1  1  1  1  2  2  2  3  3  3  
Acquirer Interest Income 162  224  246  277  335  406  509  618  746  915  
Target Interest Expense 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Acquirer Interest Expense (1.601) (2.011) (2.214) (2.355) (2.489) (2.597) (2.714) (2.754) (2.747) (2.707) 
Acquirer Other income (expense) 32  34  39  44  50  56  64  69  74  79  
Foregone Interest on Cash (103) (103) (104) (104) (105) (105) (106) (106) (107) (107) 
Net Income Before Taxes 7.087  11.550  14.966  20.052  24.830  30.444  35.480  39.379  43.584  48.099  
Provision for Income Taxes (1.488) (2.426) (3.143) (4.211) (5.214) (6.393) (7.451) (8.270) (9.153) (10.101) 
Acquirer Equity method investment activity, 
net of tax 
(38) (40) (46) (52) (60) (67) (76) (82) (87) (93) 
Net Income 5.561  9.085  11.777  15.789  19.556  23.984  27.953  31.027  34.344  37.905  
Pro-forma Adjustments 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Pro-forma Net Income 5.561  9.085  11.777  15.789  19.556  23.984  27.953  31.027  34.344  37.905  




Acquirer Average Diluted Shares 485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  
Shares Issued in Transaction 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Total Diluted Shares 485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  
Pro-forma EPS 11,5  18,7  24,3  32,6  40,4  49,5  57,7  64,0  70,9  78,2  
Acquirer Diluted EPS 10,2  17,3  22,6  30,6  38,2  47,3  55,4  61,7  68,5  75,7  
Accretion (Dilution) (USD) 1,3  1,5  1,7  2,0  2,2  2,2  2,3  2,3  2,4  2,5  
Accretion (Dilution) (%) 12,4% 8,6% 7,7% 6,6% 5,7% 4,7% 4,1% 3,8% 3,5% 3,3% 
Note. Pro-forma Adjustments are zero because neither company has reported non-recurring charges in the past three years 
